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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Interstate Commerce Commission-
Carriers-Blanket Area Rates
The ascertainment of rates offering maximum congruity among the
competing interests of producer, carrier and consumer has long been a
challenge to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Particularly in the
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
field where developed natural resources can find a market only at some
distant point has the problem of rate regulation been difficult.
In Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States1 the Commission faced
the problem of determining a rate structure for coal-producing areas in
Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky, with markets located in northern Illi-
nois and Wisconsin. Sections of each state were grouped together, and
all the mines within one section given the same rate to the particular
destination. Rates from each such area to the point of consumption were
then approved, but the differences in rates assigned to the areas were
admittedly not wholly explainable on their respective distances from
the destination points.2
Grouping all the mines in a particular area and giving each the same
flat rate to a given point has long been practiced.3 So-called blanket
areas are frequently set up by the carriers acting on their own inititative,
and where this has not been done, it may be required by the Com-
mission.4
The Commission has found the blanket areas highly desirable be-
cause they encourage a more even and fuller development of the region;
simplify marketing by allowing dealers a wider range in their choice
of materials; and, by pitting in competition producers throughout the
producing district, stimulate rivalry, and thus provide a guaranty against
exorbitant prices and undue profits.5 To the carriers, blanket area rates
offer through uniform treatment of all shippers in a large section cer-
tain administrative conveniences; through the right to haul at the same
rate though the line may be located more distant from the producer
than some other railroad, certain competitive advantages; and through
resulting production stimuli greater business potential.0 The propriety
of so establishing areas is now firmly settled in the field of administra-
tive rate making.
After the producing area is divided into blanket areas, the Commis-
169 S. Ct. 278 (1949). The case before the Commission is reported as Coal
to Beloit, Wis., and Northern Illinois, 263 I. C. C. 179 (1945).2 Coal to Beloit, Wis., and Northern Illinois, supra note 1, at 185. For example,
rates approved from the Boonville group to Beloit were $2.39 per ton for a dis-
tance of 415 miles, while rates from the Fulton-Peoria group were set at $1.80 per
ton for a distance of 170 miles. Note that in the former case the distance is
almost two and one-half times that of the latter, yet the rate is only one and one-
third larger.
' Illinois Commerce Commission v. United States, 292 U.S. 474 (1934) ; Hitch-
man Coal and Coke Co. v. B. & 0. R. R., 16 I. C. C. 512 (1909).
" United States v. Ill. Central R. R., 263 U. S. 515 (1924) ; St. Louis South-
western Ry. v. United States, 245 U. S. 136 (1917).
'Wis. & Ark. Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 33 I. C. C. 33 (1915);
Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. So. Pac. Co., 22 I. C. C. 149 (1911); Hitch-
man Coal and Coke Co. v. B. & 0. R R., 16 I. C. C. 512 (1909).
' United States v. Il. Central R. R., 263 U.S. 515 (1924) ; Arlington Heights
Fruit Exchange v. So. Pac. Co., 22 I. C. C. 149 (1911) ; Hitchman Coal and Coke
Co. v. B. & 0. R. R., 16 I. C. C. 512 (1909)
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sion as a part of the process of establishing flat rates from each to the
consuming point, attempts to correlate the charges to be assigned to
the different blanket areas in such a manner that the over-all rate making
scheme best serves the interests of all concerned.
The fact that rates as finally approved reflect conclusions not pre-
mised wholly on consideration of the interests of the producer and car-
rier does not establish their invalidity. In determining rate differentials
the Commission has not only their interests to protect-the consumer is
also entitled to consideration.7 Where he buys in an intensively com-
petitive market, rates assume increasingly significant proportions, be-
cause the variance in price of a few cents per ton is often sufficient to
divert a contract from one producer to another.8 To make rates with
a primary regard for distance could eventually have the effect of elimi-
nating practically all competition between producers, 9 with obviously
undesirable consequences to the consumer.
Recognizing this as an integral phase of the overall rate-making
problem, the Commission has consistently given weight to the con-
sumer's interests, even when the resulting rate differentials are dis-
proportionate to those which consideration only of distance and trans-
poratation factors would dictate.' 0 This practice is specifically ap-
proved by the court in the instant case.11
The influence of competition in the Commission's rate fixing process
found an interesting but typical'12 application in Birch Valley Lumber
Co. v. S. C. & M. R. R.13 There the blanket area of the B. & 0. R. R.,
main line serving the timber-growing region involved, was extended
only to lumber producers located on its main or trunk lines. Producers
B and D were well within the general blanket area, but were some 7 to
9 miles from the B. & 0. They had to pay in addition to the group rate
the charges of the S. C. & M., which carried their products to a point
on the B. & 0. The Commission found that in order to compete with
other producers B and D had to base their prices on the group rate
and absorb the charges of the S. C. & M., with the undesirable prospect
of possibly being driven out of business. The Commission concluded
that although the charges of the S. C. & M. were not unreasonable,
the refusal of the B. & 0. to extend the group rate to B and D was
7 Coal to Illinois and Wisconsin, 232 I. C. C. 151 (1939) ; Andy's Ridge Coal
Co. v. So. Ry., 18 I. C. C. 405 (1910).
1 Coal to Beloit, Wis., and Northern Illinois, 263 I. C. C. 179, 195 (1945).
'Illinois Coal Traffic Bureau v. Ahnappe & W. Ry., 204 I. C. C. 225 (1934).
" Id. at 240; Waukesha Lime and Stone Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 26
I. C. C. 515, 518 (1913).
12 69 S. Ct. 278, 288.
1" See also Indian Creek Valley Lumber Co. v. B. & 0. R. R., 126 I. C. C.
161 (1927); Tioga Coal Co. v. B. & 0. R. R., 101 I. C. C. 611 (1925); Swift
Lumber Co. v. F. & G. R. R., 61 I C. C. 485 (1921).
1- 144 I. C. C. 419 (1928).
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unduly prejudicial to them and unduly preferential to their competitors,
and entered an order requiring that their rates not exceed the rates
charged other competitors in the same general origin territory.
Decisions of the ICC are not necessarily final and may be taken
before the federal courts. But once it is determined that the Commis-
sion is acting within its statutory authority, the court's power to review
its findings of fact and rulings is extremely limited. 14 Congress in-
tended to commit these problems to a permanent expert body and the
courts recognize that they have neither the "technical competence nor
the legal authority to pronounce upon the wisdom of the course taken
by the Commission."'15 Numerous examples of court deference to the
administrative expertise of the Interstate Commerce Commission reveal
a marked indisposition even to consider the amount of weight given to
each of the factors used in determining the justifiableness of a rate, and
this proposition seems particularly applicable where the problem in-
volved concerns fixing of rates for competing areas.'0
By reaffirming in the instant case its policy of rare interference with
the Commission's rulings, the court facilitates the reaching of the sound-
est possible solution to a problem for which it can hardly be hoped to
find a perfect one.
CHARLEs L. FuLTON.
Anti-trust Laws-Requirements Contracts-Tests of Illegality
Section 3 of the Clayton Act' declares, inter alia, that "It shall be
unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods . ..
whether patented or unpatented . . . on the condition, agreement or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal
in the goods . . . of a competitor ... of the lessor or seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale... may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce."
Since its passage in 1914, the United States Supreme Court, while
not always denominating them, has had occasion to deal with two sepa-
1 I. C. C. v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567 (1947) ; United States v. Chicago Heights
Trucking Co., 310 U.S. 344 (1939).
"Board of Trade of Kansas City v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 548 (1942).1 United States v. Ill. Central R. R., 263 U.S. 515 (1924). Also see the state-
ment of Mr. Justice Douglas in the instant case: "We would depart from our
competence and our limited function in this field if we undertook to accommodate
the factors of transportation conditions, distance and competition differently than
the Commission has done in this case. That is a task peculiarly for it." 69 S. Ct.
278, 289.
'38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §14 (1946).
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rate and distinct types of contracts2 which have been attacked as viola-
tive of that statute.
The first case to reach the court, Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-
Houston Co.,3 involved the so-called exclusive dealing arrangement 4
whereby the purchaser agrees to buy all his requirements of a certain
product or products from the seller and the seller agrees to fully supply
the purchaser. The Fashion company, through such contracts, con-
trolled 40% of the pattern agencies in the country.
The court pointed out that the statute did not prohibit all contracts
that created a mere possibility that competition would be lessened, but
that a probable, substantial lessening had to be shown. However, be-
cause the defendant occupied such a dominant position in the industry,
it felt that the lower courts were justified in finding that the challenged
contracts substantially lessened competition in that they foreclosed com-
petitors of the seller from a large portion of a total market and were,
therefore, illegal.
Shortly thereafter the validity of the other type of contract, the
tying agreement, was brought into question in the case of United Shoe
Machinery Co. v. United States.5 Defendant-patentee leased its patented
shoe machinery subject to the requirement that it be used only with
other machinery also leased by defendant and that the lessee buy all its
supplies from the lessor. Defendant controlled 95% of the business in
the industry. Held: "Such restrictive and tying agreements must nec-
essarily lessen competition and tend to monopoly .... When it is con-
sidered that the United Company occupies a dominating position in
supplying shoe machinery of the classes involved, these covenants,
signed by the lessee and binding upon him, effectually prevent him from
acquiring the machinery of a competitor of the lessor.. .. -6
In both cases, then, the Supreme Court placed emphasis on evidence
that defendant occupied a dominant position in the industry. Until the
decision in International Salt Co. v. United States7 this continued to
be so. Domination of the market was regarded "as sufficient in itself to
support the inference that competition had been or probably would be
lessened" s by use of the restrictive contract, whether a requirements
- Technically, a third type of contract has been attacked in one case. Federal
Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923), in which an
agency contract was challenged as being an exclusive dealing arrangement.
a258 U.S. 346 (1922).
'Variously called the "requirements contract," Standard Oil Co. of California
v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 1051 (1949); and the "exclusive supply contract,"
Stockhausen, The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Requirements
Contracts, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rnv. 412, 416 (1948).
6258 U.S. 451 (1922). 8Id. at 457, 458.
7332 U.S. 392 (1947).
" See Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, - U.S. - , 69 S. Ct.
1051, 1056 (1949).
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or tying agreement. Thus, requirements contracts were held violative
of section 3 where defendants employing them did 90%,D 60%,o 50%11
and 40%12 of the business, as were tying clause arrangements where de-
fendants controlled 95%13 and 81%. 14
On the other hand, where defendant did but one per cent of the
business in the industry, it was held that its requirements contracts were
not illegal and the court was significantly careful to point out that in
other respects the case fell "fairly within the recent decision of . ..
Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co."'15
Later, however, the circuit courts discarded the requirement of a
showing of dominance in the tying clause cases. Although their users
protested that they were either required for the protection of good will10
or commercially necessary because of contract commitments of repair,' 7
the tying agreements were made very vulnerable by the substitution of
the more easily satisfied "quantitative" test.'8 Under this standard, a
defendant's comparative position in the industry became unimportant
if it could be shown that the volume of business done by him was quan-
titatively large. In the International Salt case the Supreme Court un-
qualifiedly endorsed this view, declaring the tying devices "unreasonable,
per se" where "any substantial market" is involved.' 0
After the International Salt decision, then, the state of the law could
be summarized as follows: In both requirements and tying clause agree-
ments a probable substantial lessening of competition had to be shown
9 Fleischmann Co., 1 F. T. C. 119 (1918).
10 Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312
U.S. 457 (1940).1 Q. R. S. Music Co. v. F. T. C., 12 F. 2d 730 (7th Cir. 1926).1 0Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922); But-
terick Co. v. F. T. C., 4 F. 2d 910 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 602 (1925).
Unte Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
"B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. F. T. C., 292 Fed. 720, 721 (7th Cir. 1923).
1International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936);
Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F. 2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aft'd per
curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936). The contention that the tying clause was necessary to
protect good will was upheld in Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., supra;
cf. F. T. C. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
" International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Judson L.
Thomson Mfg. Co. v. F. T. C., 150 F. 2d 952 (1st Cir. 1945).
's This test required only a showing that the tying clauses covered a substantial
market, measured quantitatively. Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. F. T. C., 132 F. 2d
48, 54 (4th Qr. 1942) : "If a dealer by such unfair trade practice as is here in-
volved restrains competition with respect to his customers, he ought not be per-
mitted to continue it because his portion of the national business is small . . .
(Where defendant did but from 5% to 7% of the business in the trade.) ; Oxford
Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp., 83 F. 2d 764, 766 (6th Cir. 1936) : "The
ratio borne by the defendant's volume of business to the paint and varnish industry
is not, we think, the measure by which monopolistic tendency of its contracts is to
be determined." (Where defendant did but one-half of one per cent of the business
in the trade.) ; accord, Judson L. Thomson Mfg. Co. v. F. T. C., 150 F. 2d 952
(1st Cir. 1945).
1 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
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to satisfy section 3 of the Clayton Act.20  Where the former type was
concerned nothing less than the inference of a substantial lessening, aris-
ing out of the employment of such contracts by companies dominant in
their industry would satisfy the requirement, whereas in the latter, a
showing that defendant 'did a quantitatively substantial business would
give rise to the same inference and render the contracts illegal.
The justification for dealing less harshly with requirements contracts
than with tying clause arrangements has been discussed by many
writers.21
Whereas both types of agreements lessen competition in the sense
that they deprive the seller or lessor's competitors of access to the mar-
ket provided by the purchaser or lessee for the duration of the agree-
ment, the requirement contracts, as contrasted with the tying agree-
ments, do have legitimate business purposes. They benefit the buyer in
that they assure him of a constant and adequate supply and thereby
relieve him of the necessity of storing commodities for which his demand
varies. Furthermore, by protecting him against rises in prices, they
enable him to engage in long-term planning on the basis of known costs.
The seller is also benefited in that he is assured of his demand and con-
sequently may cut down on his selling expenses. If he is a newcomer
to the field, he may estimate what capital expenses are justified by esti-
mating, on the basis of such contracts, what the demand for his product
will be. Still more important is the fact that if competition for the pa-
tronage of the ultimate consumer is present, the benefits accruing to
the contracting parties must necessarily be passed on to the general
public in the form of lower costs and better service.
On the other hand, tying agreements have been used only for the
suppression of competition. They are the means of coercing the lessee
who needs the patented article into buying all his supplies from the
patentee, and thereby,.in effect, extending the patent-sanctioned monop-
oly to unpatented goods which are tied to it. Benefits from the ar-
rangement will rarely accrue either to the lessee or the public, and in
the usual case both will suffer since the monopolist has the power to
charge what the traffic will bear.
Whether or not this preferential treatment of requirements contracts
was justified, the late case of Standard Oil Co. of California v. United
States22 has made it clear that they will no longer be accorded it. In
that case, defendant, doing business in seven western states, sold 23%
of the gasoline purchased in that area during the year 1946. The-
majority of these sales were made through company-owned service sta-
o Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356 (1922).
21 E.g., Stockhausen, The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Re-
quirements Contracts, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 412 (1948).2269 S. Ct. 1051 (1949).
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tions or to industrial users, and the percentage of the total purchases
from all suppliers which were made pursuant to defendant's exclusive
supply contracts was but 6.7%. However, the dollar volume of Stand-
ard's business in the same year was large, amounting to over $58 million.
The District Court,2 3 when presented with these figures, could dis-
cover scant authority among the requirements contract cases for a find-
ing that they showed any substantial lessening of competition. Per-
centages had always controlled, and, as noted above, there was no re-
quirements case where a defendant had been found to occupy a market
position sufficiently dominant to make its interference substantial in the
absence of a showing that it had done at least 40%5 of the business in
the industry.24 However, the court was of the opinion that the tying
clause case of International Salt Co. v. United States controlled,2 and,
finding sales under the exclusive supply contracts quantitatively large,
determined that they were illegal. In so doing, it refused to hear testi-
mony as to the commercial merits of the exclusive dealing arrangements
or to make findings as to whether Standard's competitive position had
improved or deteriorated under the system.20
The Supreme Court, after reviewing all section 3 cases with which
it had dealt prior to the International Salt case, concluded that none con-
trolled since they had stressed the dominant position of defendant in the
market and Standard did not occupy such a position. Moreover, the
court conceded the economic advantages of the requirements contract
and admitted that "since these advantages . . . may often be sufficient
to account for their use, the coverage by such contracts of a substantial
amount of business affords a weaker basis for the inference that compe-
tition may be lessened than would similar coverage by tying clauses.
. . .," It therefore felt that it "could not dispose of this case merely
by citing International Salt Co. v. United States"28 which involved the
tying agreement.
So, instead of relying on that case, it turned to the statute itself and
observed that since the requirements contract is one for the "sale of
goods ... on the condition ... that the ... purchaser thereof shall not
2 United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 78 F. Supp. 850 (S. D. Cal.
1948), aff'd, 69 S. Ct. 1051 (1949).
-" See notes 9-15 supra.
5 While perhaps the court felt that the "dominance" test could be met in this
case by virtue of the fact that other major suppliers in the area also employed the
exclusive supply device and, considered collectively, dominated the market, it rested
its decision on the quantitative test, saying ". . . as I read the latest cases of
the Supreme Court, I am compelled to find the practices here involved to be viola-
tive [of section three]. For they affect injuriously a sizeable part of interstate
commerce . . ." United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 78 F. Supp. 850,
875 (S. D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, 69 S. Ct. 1051 (1949).
2' Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 1051, 1054 (1949).
1051, 1054 (1949).
"'Id. at 1059. 28Ibid.
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use or deal in the goods . . .of a competitor or competitors of the ...
seller,"29 it must fall within the prohibitions of section 3 if "the effect
of such . . .contract . . .may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."8 0
The court was of the opinion that in determining this "effect" it
could give no consideration to the commercial merits and demerits of
the contract involved, because it was not faced "with a broadly phrased
expression of general policy [leaving it free to apply a more lenient test
of illegality to requirements contracts], but merely a broadly phrased
qualification of an otherwise narrowly directed statutory provision,"31
and that the congressional intent behind the legislation had been to out-
law all exclusive dealing contracts which foreclose competion in a quan-
titatively substantial share of the line of commerce affected.
So interpreted, the statute did not leave room for evidence as to
defendant's competitive position in the industry nor for testimony as to
the commercial justification of the contract in the particular case. Con-
sequently, the judgment below was affirmed.
Whatever arguments may be advanced against it, the decision in the
Standard Oil case makes it clear that all restrictive contracts, whether
of the tying or requirements variety, are illegal, without regard to sur-
rounding circumstances and without resort to inference, if used by a
defendant doing a quantitatively substantial volume of business.8 2
Section 3 does not, of course, deal with the ordinary long-term con-
tract in which the purchaser agrees to buy a denominated amount of
goods from the seller rather than all his requirements. Neither does it
affect contracts of agency wherein the agent gets all his requirements
from the principal. Moreover, the tying clause and requirements con-
tract would likewise seem to be legal if its employer does not do a sub-
stantial volume of business in dollars and cents. Thus the small busi-
nessman can continue to use them in safety, if he can be sure that he
is small enough. The difficulty is in the determination of where the
line will be drawn between substantiality and insubstantiality.
ROBERT PERRY, JR.
3O38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §14 (1946).
80 Ibid.
3 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 1051, 1061 (1949).
'- "We conclude, therefore, that the qualifying clause of section 3 is satisfied by
proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of
commerce affected:' Id. at 1062.
19.501
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Constitutional Law-Absence of Quorum in
Congressional Committee Hearings
Petitioner gave false testimony under oath before a standing com-
mittee of the House of Representatives, and was convicted of perjury in
the district court.' The conviction was affirmed in the Court of Ap-
peals,2 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.8 The Court in a
five to four decision4 reversed the conviction, and held that the com-
mittee was not a "competent tribunal" within the meaning of the per-
jury statute,5 because a quorum of the committee was not "actually
physically present" at the time the perjured testimony was given. In
so holding the Court was called upon to examine the appropriate parlia-
mentary rules of procedure of the House of Representatives.
The House rules which have been described as "perhaps the most
finely adjusted, scientifically balanced, and highly technical rules of any
parliamentary body in the world" emanate from four sources: (1) The
Constitution of the United States (2) Jefferson's Manualo (3) from
the rules adopted by the House itself from the beginning of its exist-
ence,7 and (4) from the decisions of the Speakers of the House, and
from decisions of the Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole.8
The Constitution gives the power to each House of Congress to
determine its rules of procedure ;9 however certain limitations on this
grant are also contained therein.10 Among these is the requirement
that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,",
'U. S. v. Christoffel,-App. D. C.-(D. D. C. 1948).
' Christoffel v. U. S., 171 F. 2d 1004 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
'Christoffel v. U.S., 336 U.S. 934 (1949).
'Christoffel v. U.S., 338 U.S. 84 (1949). Justices Black, Frankfurter, Doug-
las and Rutledge joined with Justice Murphy in the majority opinion.
'D. C. CODE, Title 22, Sec. 2501 (1940).
'In the years from 1797 to 1801 Thomas Jefferson who was then Vice-Presi-
deni of the U.S. and President of the Senate, prepared the notable work which is
now known as JEFRmsoN's MANuAL. This work has contributed much to the
procedure of the House, and in 1837 the House passed a rule, which still exists,
permitting the provisions of the Manual "to govern the House in all cases to
which they are applicable, and . . . not inconsistent" with the House rules.
JEFFERSON'S MANUAL. §938. The Manual along with other House rules is now
published as a public document, the current issue being H. R. Doc. No. 766, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1949).
'JEFFERSON'S MANUAL §§621-958.
'These rulings are to the rules of the House what the decisions of the courts
are to the statutes. All of the decisions (more than 11,000 in number) have been
embodied in HINDS' PRECEDENTS and CANNON'S PRECEDENTS.
I U.S. CoNsT., Art. 1, §5, cl. 1. Some text writers have expressed the view
that the power of a legislative body to make its own rules is an inherent power
and no constitutional mandate is necessary. 1 SOUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
srRucrioN, §602.
o U. S. CoNsT. Art. 1, §§5, 7.
"U.S. CoNsT. Art. 1, §5, cl. 2. After organization of the House the quorum
consists of a majority of those members chosen, sworn and living, whose member-
ship has not been terminated by resignation or by action of the House. IV HxNDs'
PRECEDENTS §§2889, 2890; VI CANNON'S PREcEDENTS 638. Under Speaker Reed's
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Accordingly it has been frequently ruled, that upon failure of a quorum,
no business, however highly privileged, is in order, and the only mo-
tions entertainable are those for a call of the House or to adjourn.12
Yet, it seems to be the accepted practice of the House that a quorum
is presumed to be present until otherwise determined,' 3 and no affirma-
tive duty seems to be placed upon the Chair to ascertain the presence
of a quorum unless the point is raised or disclosed. 14 Once absence
of a quorum is disclosed on a point of order,15 or a division,' 6 by
tellers,' 7 or on a yea or nay vote,' 5 business is automatically sus-
pended,' 9 and no business may be transacted, even by unanimous con-
sent, 20 and there must be a quorum of record before the House may
proceed ;21 nevertheless once a proceeding is completed it is then too late
to make the point that a quorum was not present when action was
taken.,22
The rules of the House are expressly made the rules of the standing
committees in so far as they are applicable.23 A majority of a commit-
tee constitutes a quorum for business, 24 and no measure or recommenda-
tion may be reported from a committee unless a majority of the com-
mittee is actually present.2 5 Contrary to the House practice, there must
be a quorum of record before the committee may proceed with busi-
ness.26
In applying these rules the Court seemed to narrow the issue to the
question-Once a quorum is ascertained on the record of the com-
mittee, does the presumption prevail that a quoroum continues until
the point of no quorum is made?
In a vigorous dissent,2 7 the minority insisted that the quorum
famous "count," the principle of a present rather than voting quorum was ac-
cepted, when Reed counted members present for purposes of a quorum, even
though they refused to vote. The constitutionality of this rule was questioned
and upheld in U.S. v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892), the Court ruling therein that the
Constitution prescribed no method of determining the presence of a majority.
" JEFFERSON'S MANUAL §768, IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §2950; VI CANNON'S
PRECEDENTS §680.
'- VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §624.
,VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §565. Even upon convening the House each day
it is not incumbent on the Speaker to raise the quorum question. IV HINDS'
PRECEDENTS §2733; VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §624.
" VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §662. " IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §2933.
"VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §707; VIII CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §3097.
"' IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §2953; VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §624.
"IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §§2933, 2934; VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §662.
"IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §2951; VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §§660, 686, 689.
21 IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §§2952, 2953.
"VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §655. " JEFFERSON'S MANUAL §738.
" JEFFERSON'S MANUAL §409; IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §§4540, 4552.
"JEFFERSON'S MANUAL §943. 2"VIII CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §2222.
"'Justice Jackson writing for the minority was joined by Chief Justice Vinson
and Justices Reed and Burton. The dissent was based in part on the fact that
the identical issue had been raised in a previous perjury case and the Court denied
certiorari. Meyer v. U.S., 171 F. 2d 800 (D. C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
912 (1949).
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established at the convening of the committee session was presumed
to continue in absence of a challenge to the contrary, and contended
that the Court in holding otherwise was denying to the records and
rules of the Congress the respect and reliance to which they are entitled.
The "presumption" rule unquestionably is the "law" of the House,
but a search reveals no incident where the specific point has been dealt
with in committee. In the principal case there was a recorded quorum
when the committee convened, and the point of no quorum was neither
raised by petitioner nor a committee member. 28 The Court places much
reliance on the rule that no bill may be reported from a committee
unless a majority of the committee was actually present. 20 The rule
seems inappropriate for the purposes of this case. Indeed, the very
fact that the rule applies on its face only to the reporting of a bill,
suggests that a "physically present" quorum is not necessary to the
competency of the committee for some lesser purpose such as receiving
testimony. Besides, the argument might well be made that since the
committee rules are the same as the House rules where applicable, the
"presumption" rule prevails in the committee subject to the one condi-
tion that a quorum must be on record before the proceeding start. The
Court while apparently applying one of these rules, seemingly is unwill-
ing to apply the other. Therefore, the result reached seems to be
justified only by a strict, literal interpretation of the committee rule
requiring a quorum to do business, and upon the consideration that the
Court was satisfying a requirement of a criminal statute. From a prac-
tical viewpoint, considering the possible delays and inconveniences to
the orderly facilitation of committee business, the requisite of a "physi-
cally present" quorum seems extremely harsh if it is to apply to all
testimony as distinguished from testimony taken under oath as in the
principal case. There is ample evidence of Congressional disapproval
with the result reached. 30 In fact a bill has been introduced which
would expressly make the "presumption" rule applicable to com-
mittees.3 1
Assuming that the lecision rendered in the principal case would
indicate that an actual quorum must be present in order that a Con-
gressional committee may transact any business, does it follow that the
" Can a witness raise a point of no quorum? The Court did not rule on this,
but indicated that the privilege is limited to members of the committee. The dis-
sent suggested that a witness might well raise the point, and if the objection be
overruled, he would be at liberty to leave the hearing. H. R. 6166, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949), introduced shortly after this decision recognizes the right of a
witness to make the point of no quorum.
2' Sed note 25 supra.
50 95 CONG. Rac. A4366 (June 29, 1949) ; 95 CoNG. Rzc. 9845, 9858, 9859, 9884(July 18, 1949) ; 95 CONG. Rae. A4902 (July 21, 1949).
" H. R. 6166, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). No action was taken during the
1st Session on this measure.
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same rule would be made applicable in the House? The possibility that
legislation passed without a record vote might be "invalidated" was
suggested by the dissent.3 2
If the Court continues to follow the policy of several of its previous
decisions,33 to the effect that the enrolled bill 34 is conclusive evidence
of enactment, and that no other evidence is admissable to establish that
the bill was not lawfully enacted, such a proposition as is envisioned by
the dissent would seem to be without foundation.
LINDSAY C. WARPEN, JR.
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Conflict with Power of
State to Control Breaches of the Peace
There are inherent inconsistencies between the power of the state
to punish breaches of the peace and the constitutional protections of
the First Amendment. The case of Terminiello v. Chicago' exemplifies
the problem of weighing the sometimes conflicting social interests in
the maintenance of public order and in the free expression of ideas.
The case arose out of an address by Terminiello before an audience
of over eight hundred. About one thousand persons, opposed to his
espoused doctrine of racial and religious supremacy, had gathered about
the auditorium in protest. A police detail, assigned to the meeting,
was unable to prevent several disturbances and minor acts of violence.
The speech itself viciously attacked various political and racial groups.
The general setting, then, was an address, pseudopolitical in nature, but
scurrilous and opprobrious in content, delivered in an auditorium sur-
rounded by an angry and turbulent crowd.
Terminiello, after jury trial, was convicted of violating an ordinance 2 -
of the City of Chicago by making an improper noise or diversion tend-
ing to a breach of the peace.
The trial court charged that "misbehavior may constitute a breach
" Christoffel v. U.S., 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
"Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1891) ; Lyons v. Woods, 153 U.S. 649 (1894);
Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547 (1896); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167
U.S. 196 (1897); Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); see Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 457 (1939) (concurring opinion) ; Flint v. Stone Tracy,
220 U.S. 107, 143 (1910); cf. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); U.S. v.
Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
" An enrolled bill generally refers to a bill which purports to have passed both
houses of the legislature, and which has been signed by the presiding officers of the
two houses. The Supreme Court of the U.S. includes not only process of enact-
ment within the legislature itself, but also signature by the President and filing
with the Secretary of State.
169 Sup. Ct. 894 (1949).
'"All persons who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in making any im-
proper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a
breach of the peace . . . shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct . . 2, , City
of Chicago, REV. CODE 1939, c. 193, §1(1).
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of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about
a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance." The defendant took
no exception to that instruction, but maintained that the ordinance as
applied to his conduct violated his right to free speech under the Federal
Constitution. The Illirjois appellate courts found that the speech was
composed of derisive, "fighting" words, which carried it outside the
scope of the constitutional guarantees, and affirmed the conviction. 3
The United States Supreme Court did not reach the "fighting
words" issue, but held the trial court's instruction to be a binding con-
struction of state law, permitting conviction of the dlefendant if his
speech invited public dispute or brought about a condition of unrest,
and, thus construed, the ordinance was unconstitutional. That defend-
ant took no exception to the charge was held to be immaterial since he
had attacked the ordinance as a whole, and the verdict being a general
one, it could not be determined that the -defendant was not convicted
under the unconstitutional construction of the statute.
4
Mr. Justice Jackson dissented on the ground that the court, in lifting
the charge to the jury out of its context, had considered it as an abstrac-
tion, and that the charge, when given, took color from the realities
surrounding the delivery of the address. Accordingly, the jury had
found a breach of the peace of a nature not entitled to constitutional
protections.5
The First Amendment is unequivocal in its expression that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." And,
by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this
freedom is protected from impairment by the states.7
But all speech is not protected. Certain classes of speech, including
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words are punished because "their very utterance inflict in-
jury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
Chicago v. Terminiello, 332 Ill. App. 17, 74 N. E. 2d 45 (1947), aff'd, 400
Ill. 23, 79 N. E. 2d 39 (1948).
'The court relies upon Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), where a
statute proscribed three types of conduct and a general verdict of conviction fol-
lowed. There it had been contended throughout the proceedings that one of the
proscriptions was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. All the Strombcrg
case holds is that where the validity of a statute is successfully assailed as to one
of three clauses of the statute, and all three clauses were submitted to the jury,
the general verdict has an infirmity because it cannot be assumed that the jury
convicted on the valid portion of the statute. The case offers no precedent for
searching the record for error that at no time was urged before the state court
and that was explicitly disclaimed on behalf of the defendant before the Supreme
Court. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Terminiello v. Chicago, 69
Sup. Ct. 894, 898 (1949).
Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 900 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
O U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. I.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925) ; cf. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Since such ut-
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Speech of public interest, including words of idea-conveying nature,
may be punished if "the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that (the state) has a right to
prevent."9  This clear and present danger test was first enunciated in
an "attempt" case to determine whether the verbal acts came close
enough to the acts described in the statute to be punished.'0 It has
since leen employed to test the validity of a statute on its face"' and
to -determine whether a conviction obtained under a statute not found
to be invalid could be sustained.12  It has been applied to test a con-
viction for common law breach of the peace. 13 However, if the statute
itself declares that certain utterances are inimical to the public welfare,
idea-conveying speech may be punished without the .necessity of satis-
fying the clear and present danger test.' 4
The propriety of the court's searching the record for error and the
question of whether the jury may have convicted Terminiello of merely
terances do not form an essential part of any exposition of ideas and are of slight
social value as a step toward truth, any benefit that may be derived from them is
outweighed by the social interests in order and morality. CHAFE, FRaE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (1941). This was the rationale of the Illinois courts'
holding that Terminiello's speech was not within the constitutional guarantees;
he had referred to certain racial groups as "slimy scum," "bedbugs," and "snakes."
See State v. Warren, 113 N. C. 683, 18 S. E. 498 (1893) (an act of the Legis-
lature making it unlawful to use profane language in certain localities is not an
undue interference with freedom of speech).
'Shenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
10 Shenk v. United States, supra note 9.
" West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
12 Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
1 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The test was referred to and
approved in both the majority opinion and Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion
in the instant case. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 896, 905 (1949).
The quoted expression from the Shenk case has represented the traditional
phrasing of the clear and present danger test. It has occasionally been paraphrased
to the same general effect: ". . . suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated
only when the expression presents a clear and present danger . . ." (italics mine).
See West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).
Mr. Justice Douglas, in the majority opinion, uses the phrasing "likely to produce
a clear and present danger" (italics mine). See Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 Sup.
Ct. 894, 896 (1949). This should not represent a departure from the principle
that "the degree of imminence of the substantive evil must be extremely high
before utterances can be punished." See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263
(1941).
1' Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Whether the "Gitlow distinc-
tion" is still the law is not clear. The Gitlow case was distinguished in Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 256-258 (1937). The distinction was not applied in Tay-
lor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 589 (1943) or Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 105 (1940). But the Gitlow distinction was regarded as the law in Dunne v.
United States, 138 F. 2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943),
rehearings denied, 320 U.S. 814, 815 (1944). However the appeal of the convic-
tion of the Communist leaders may provide a definitive statement as to whether
the clear and present danger test must be satisfied for a conviction under an act
such as the North Carolina Subversive Activities Statute, N. C. GEN. STAT. 14-11
(1943), discussed in 19 N. C. L. REv. 466 (1941).
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"inviting public dispute" are not the fundamental problems posed by
the Terminiello case. Rather the question is, "To what extent is con-
trol of the expression of ideas compatible with dynamic democratic
processes?" And, conversely, "How may the order requisite to the
functioning of a democratic society be maintained without restrictions
upon the abuse of the freedoms of expression ?"5
We have seen that the constitutional guarantees are not absolute, but
that speech of public interest is subject to the clear and present danger
restriction; and when the statute itself declares certain speech to be
unlawful, even that test may not need to be satisfied. Our right to
express ideas of public interest is not unqualified, but may be limited.
That is the meaning of the First Amendment as interpreted by the
Supreme Court.
This construction is inconsistent with the literal language of the
Amendment and perhaps with our traditions. 16 It is incompatible with
the interpretation that "no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no
counterbelief, no relevant information may be kept from (the voting
citizen)."17 There are those who believe that, so construed, the constitu-
tional protection is essentially stripped of its vigor.' 8
But there are others who, with equal sincerity and conviction, feel
that if the interchange of ideas contemplated by the First Amendment
is to serve its aim, their presentation must be accompanied by order;
and that the weapon of either the Facist or Communist who would over-
throw democracy is -disorder and mob action. Accordingly, they feel
that the recent cases, culminating in the Terminiello case, in their effort
to protect the freedoms of expression, are undermining the police power
that is the community's only protection from lawlessness and anarchy.1 0
1 "The problem which Lincoln cast in memorable dilemma: 'Must a government
of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain
its own existence?'" See Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
596 (1940).
'x "If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union, or to change its
republican form, let them stand undisturbed, as monuments of the safety with
which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it."
Jefferson, First Inaugural Address.
But cf. Mr. Justice Jackson's thesis that since the people, in adopting state
constitutional provisions, have universally qualified them to make persons respon-
sible for abuse of the liberty of free speech, that is what is meant by the cryptic
phrase "freedom of speech" as used in the Federal Constitution. See Terminiello
v. Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 907 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
:
1t MEIKLEjOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 89(1948).
"I See MEIKLEJOHN, op. cit. supra note 17 and Rosenwein, The Sutpreme Court
and Freedom of Speech, 9 LAw GUILD RFv. 70 (1949).
1" "Streets and parks maintained by the public cannot legally be denied to
groups 'for the communication of ideas.' Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ;
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). Cities may not protect their streets from
activities which the law has always regarded subject to control as nuisances
(handbill distribution cases). Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Cities may not protect the streets or even homes
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How to maintain public order without impairing our freedoms of
expression is one of the major dilemmas of our time. The public turns
to the law and to the lawyer for its solution. The lawyer can help with
the answer only when he is aware that every restriction placed upon
the free exchange of ideas of public interest, however justified, is a
restriction upon a basic right of a citizen in a free society and, further,
realizes that those elements which would overthrow our democratic
society employ disorder and mob violence as primary weapons.2 0
WILLIAM V. BuiRow.
Corporations-Process-Service on Non-Resident
Directors of Domestic Corporation
The corporation is a necessary party to a stockholders' derivative
suit against the directors for mismanagement.1 This suit has been held
to be an action in personam, 2 service not being allowed by publication
on the non-resident directors.3 Thus a long recognized problem arises :4
How can service of process be had on non-resident directors in the juris-
diction where the corporation is resident? " * * * those (directors) who
have looted and misappropriated corporate assets will be enabled to
escape liability by reason of the fact that the corporation is not doing
of their inhabitants from the aggressions of organized bands operating in large
numbers. Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). . . . Neither a private
party nor a public authority can invoke otherwise valid state laws against trespass
to exclude from their property groups bent on disseminating propaganda. Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ; Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946). Picket-
ing is largely immunized from control on the ground that it is free speech, Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), and police may not regulate sound trucks
and loud-speakers, Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)." See Terminiello v.
Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 907 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
20 Mr. Norman Thomas, writing out of his rich experience, said very recently,
"The heretic has always been the growing point in society. When he is repressed
by force society stagnates ...clearly our danger is not from the honest dis-
senter, but from the passions of the mob and those who manipulate it in the strug-
gle for profit and power." Thomas, The Dissenter's Role in- a Totalitarian Age,
N. Y. Times Magazine, Nov. 20, 1949, p. 13.
113 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. (PEam. ED.) §5997.
23 FLETCHER CYc. CoRp. (PER1. ED.) §1283.
'Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 245, 48 Atl. 621 (1901), Southern Mills Inc. v. Arm-
strong, 223 N. C. 495, 27 S. E. 2d 281 (1943), cf. McNaughton v. Broach, 236
App Div. 448, 260 N. Y. Supp. 100 (1932). Seinble Bauer v. Parker, 82 App.
Div. 289, 81 N.Y. Supp. 995 (1903). But cf. Holmes v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 359,
114 N. E. 841 (1916). Note, 148 A. L. R. 1251.
'Greer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428 (1903); see Freeman v.
Bean, 243 App. Div. 503, 276 N. Y. Supp. 310, 311 (1934) (dissenting opinion).
Report of Law Revision Commission for 1941, N. Y. La. Doc. (1941) No. 65 (I).
27 CORN. L. Q. 74 (1941) ; 22 VA. L. Rav. 153 (1935) ; 33 VA. L. REV. 187 (1947) ;
44 Y. L. J. 1041 (1934). Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir.
1947) discusses this problem in federal jurisdiction.
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business within the jurisdiction where the wrongdoers reside and where
they alone can be served." 5
In 1947 the Legislature of South Carolina passed a statute in an
attempt to remedy this unwarranted situation as to South Carolina
corporations.0 The statute provides in essence that by becoming or
remaining a director in a domestic corporation, a non-resident thereby
appoints the Secretary of State of South Carolina his lawful attorney
in fact for service of process in the courts of South Carolina for any
action thereafter 7 arising relating to actions of the corporation which
arose While he held office. In a recent case arising under this statute
the Supreme Court of South Carolina refused to give the statute retro-
active effect, saying: "Not only does the act evince an intent that it
should operate prospectively but such is the reasonable inference from
the fiction of implied consent upon which it is based." s Thus the con-
stitutionality of the statute was not directly in issue, but the inference
to be drawn from the opinion is that the court would hold the statute
constitutional, a proper case arising.
This South Carolina statute appears to have been patterned after
the non-resident motor vehicle laws which have been held constitu-
tional.9 It provides that notice be mailed to the director by the Secre-
tary of State,10 that such continuance shall be granted by the court as
to afford reasonable opportunity to defend the suit,11 and that any per-
son who is a director may resign within thirty days and not be subject
to this act.' 2 The "motor vehicle laws" have been upheld on the theory
that "In the public interest the state may make and enforce regulations
'Goldberg v. Emanuel, 166 Misc. 610, 613, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 943, 946 (Sup. Ct.
1938) rev'd 254 App. Div. 556, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 946 (1st dept. 1938). This problem
would also exist where there are resident directors but they are insolvent.
'Acts and Joint Resolutions South Carolina, 45 STAT. AT LARGE 277 (May 19,
1947).
" Italics added.
'Johnson v. Baldwin, 53 S. E. 2d 785, 787 (S. C. 1949).
'Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1926).
"0 Sec. 2: "...; PROVIDED, the Secretary of State shall forthwith forward
one copy of such Summons and Complaint to the non-resident director so served,
by registered mail directed to such non-resident director at the last address filed
with the Secretary of State as hereinafter provided." This is a requirement under
the decision of Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
" Sec. 5: PENDING ACTIONS.-"That the Court in which any action pro-
vided for herein is pending shall orde such continuance as may be necessary to
afford such non-resident director so served as provided herein reasonable oppor-
tunity to defend the action."
"Sec. 6: NONRESIDENT DIRECTOR RESIGNING SUCH OFFICE.
"That any person now a non-resident director of any such domestic corporation
who shall within thirty (30) days from the date of approval of this Act, resign
in good faith as such director and shall file with the Secretary of State a copy of
such signed resignation shall not be subject to the provisions of this Act; and
any person who may hereafter be subject to this Act may terminate its application
as to him except for causes of action already accrued, by bona fide resigning as




reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and
non-residents alike, who use its highways."' 3 Following this idea of "in
the public interest," statutes have been upheld requiring non-residents
"doing business" in a state to appoint agents for service of process.' 4
The reasoning behind these statutes is that although a state may not
exclude an individual from doing business in the state,.5 it may require
that certain conditions be complied with to safeguard its citizens.' o It
is submitted that by participating in the management and direction of
a corporation a director is thereby doing business in the state where the
corporation is present. Is this "doing business" sufficiently related to
the public interest to justify such a statute as South Carolina has passed?
In view of the number of "Blue Sky Laws" and regulations governing
the sale of securities' 7 it would appear that the public is vitally interested
in the protection of the investor. Further the Supreme Court of the
United States upheld an Iowa statute providing for service on an agent
in that state where the non-resident was doing business, his business
being the sale of securities.' 8 It would appear that the South Carolina
statute is a further means of protecting the investor, non-resident as
well as resident, by providing him with a practical means of protecting
his investment against unwarranted acts of corporate directors.
Another approach to this problem would be via the corporation. A
corporation is a creature of the law,19 and it is not entitled to the
"privileges and immunities" clause of the constitutibn.20 The privilege
of forming a corporation is granted by the state,21 therefore the state
necessarily lays down the regulations and requirements to be complied
with in incorporation.2 2 Why could not a state require, as South Caro-
lina has in essence done, that all the directors of a domestic corpo-
ration must be amenable to process within the state, non-residents
3 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1926).
"' Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 218 Iowa 529, 255 N. W. 667 (1934) aff'd 294
U.S. 623 (1935), Davidson v. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700 (1932),
Doggett v. Peek, 32 F. Supp. 889 (N. D. Tex. 1940), aff'd 116 F. 2d 273 (1940),
Wein v. Crockett, - Utah - , 195 P. 2d 222 (1948). But cf. Flexner v.
Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919). 23 CALIF. L. REV. 482 (1934); 32 H. L. REv. 87(1918) ; 20 IowA L. REV. 853 (1934) ; 29 MARQ. L. REv. 31 (1945) ; 32 MIcH. L.
REv. 909 (1933) ; 14 TEX. L. REv. 71 (1935) ; 2 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 75 (1940).
" U. S. Coi~sr. ART. IV, §2.
16 "(Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916)) recognizes power of the state
to exclude a nonresident until formal appointment (condition) is made." Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 355, 356 (1926).
1 14 FLErcHER Cyc. CORP. (PamM. ED.) §§6734-6780.
"'fDoherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
" Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.)
518 (1819).
.oBlake v. MeClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
2 1 BALLANTNE, CORPORATIONS (REV. ED.) §8a; CLARK, CORPORATIONS (21) ED.)
p. 4; STEVENs, CoRPoRATIoNs c. 1, §1; FLETcHER Cyc. CORP. (PERm. ED.) §114.
"' 1 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. (PERM. ED.) §114.
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through service on the Secretary of State? This would not appear to
be a discrimination in violation of the constitution, but rather a provi-
sion to put nonresidents on an equal footing with residents28 amenable
to process within the state, the only difference being in the type of
service. The Supreme Court of the United States has said, "Literal
and precise equality in respect of this matter is not attainable, it is not
required."12 4
A closely related problem arose in North Carolina in connection with
the "double liability" feature of bank stock.25 A resident of New York
held stock in a North Carolina bank. The bank failed and an assessment
was made against the stock of the non-resident and docketed in the local
county where the bank was located, in accordance with the North Caro-
lina statute. On failure of the stockholder to pay this assessment, the
commissioner brought suit on said assessment in New York,2 0 and re-
covery was allowed on the theory that the non-resident stockholder as-
sented to this type of liability by becoming a member of the corpora-
tion.2 7 Thus, if a stockholder by becoming a member of a corporation
consents to the liability involved, why could this not hold true for a
non-resident director in a South Carolina corporation under the statute
herein discussed?
From the foregoing discussion it is submitted that this South Caro-
lina statute should be upheld as constitutional and very desirable.
Though it is conceded that this type of statute may tend to discourage
incorporation in South Carolina,29 this seemingly disadvantageous as-
pect is well overcome by the advantage secured to the investing public
in being able to better protect its interest.
A. A. ZOLLICOrFER.
Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935), Kane v. N. J., 242 U.S. 160(1916).
" Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) quoting from Canadian Northern Ry.
Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 561-562 (1919).
It is interesting to note further that the Supreme Court has upheld a statute
requiring non-residents to post bond for cost, even though such is not required of
a resident. Ownby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). N. C. GEr. STAT. §28-35
(1943) requires a foreign executor to post bond whereas a local executor does not
have to.
" N. C. Pub. Laws (1927) c. 113, §13. This statute was held constitutional
in Corp. Com. of the State of North Carolina v. Murphey, 197 N. C. 42, 147 S. E.
667 (1929) aff'd 280 U.S. 534 (1939).
' Said assessment "shall be recorded and indexed as judgments, and shall have
the force and effect of a judgment of the Superior Court of this state **** if not
paid execution may ***-*** issue against the stockholder delinquent." N. C. Pub.
Laws (1927) c. 113, §13.
"7 Hood v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 270 N. Y. 17, 200 N. E. 55 (1936).
It is interesting to note that the court continually repeated that this assessment
was not the same as a judgment, though the Supreme Court of the United States
upheld the statute which said that it was, supra note 26.
" However, it is doubtful whether at the time of incorporation, misfeasance of
the directors is anticipated. A possible solution to avoid the "strike suit" would
be the requirement that a person seeking to take advantage of the procedure under
this statute be required to post a bond to cover the traveling expenses of the non-





In 1776 the first Constitution of North Carolina was adopted. The
experiences of that period were naturally conducive to the idea that
certain rights and privileges of the governed were fundamental and
should be placed beyond legislative, executive, or judicial control. These
fundamental rights were so jealously regarded that the North Carolina
Constitutional Convention of 1788 refused to ratify the proposed Fed-
eral Constitution until the adoption in that instrument of the Bill of
Rights, calculated to secure these rights, was assured.1 Among the
rights thus protected, in both Federal and State Constitutions, is that
of the accused, in all criminal prosecutions, ". . . To confront the ac-
cusers and witnesses with other testimony .... " Agreeably to the
admonition that "A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is
absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty,"3 it is the pur-
pose here to examine the measure of protection this provision affords
the accused, its nature and extent, and the circumstances under which
it may be lost.
4
Confrontation may be claimed as of right "In all criminal proceed-
ings . . .", which includes trials of common law and statutory crimes.
A question arises, however, as to whether it may be so claimed in cases
of a hybrid nature.5 Proceedings to disbar attorneys,6 to commit luna-
IIV ELLio's DEBATES ON FEDERAL CONSTUnON, 1788-1836, at 237-242; State
v. Love, 187 N. C. 32, 121 S. E. 20 (1923); State v. Dowdy, 145 N. C. 432, 58
S. E. 1002 (1907).
- N. C. CoNs'., Declaration of Rights, §7 (1776) ; N. C. CoNsT., Art. I, §11;
U. S. CoNsT., AmEND. VI. The federal right is differently phrased. It is to the
effect that, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused . . . shall enjoy the right to
be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . " The terminology varies with
different state constitutions. No distinction based on this variance seems to be
drawn.
N. C. Const., Art. I, §29 (1868).
'This note supplements Coates, Limitations on Investigating Officers, 15 N. C.
L. REV. 229, 242 (1937). A critical analysis of the rules of evidence and procedure
is here impossible. However, those of particular interest in their effect on con-
frontation will be noted.
At one time, in North Carolina, the begetting of a bastard child was regarded
as a criminal offense. State v. Mitchell, 119 N. C. 784, 25 S. E. 783 (1896). Under
N. C. GEN. STAT. §49-2 (1943) this act is no longer regarded as a criminal of-
fense. State v. Dill, 224 N. C. 57, 29 S. E. 2d 145 (1944).
o In re West, 212 N. C. 189, 193 S. E. 134 (1937) ; In re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48,
167 S. E. 382 (1932) ; In re Ebbs, 150 N. C. 44, 63 S. E. 190 (1908).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §84-28 (1943) is the statutory authority for disbarment pro-
ceedings. N. C. GEN. STAT. §84-36 (1943) preserves the court's inherent power
over its officers. N. C. GENi. STAT. §84-30 (1943) protects accused's right to
compulsory process and counsel, but not confrontation.
it re West, stupra, states that, "It is not after the manner of our courts, how-
ever, to deprive a lawyer, any more than anyone else, of his constitutional guaran-
ties or to revoke his license without due process of law." This statement is under-
stood to indicate that the rules applicable to civil actions will be enforced.
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tics7 and alcoholics,8 and to punish for contempt are not restricted by
this constitutional provision. Cases within the jurisdiction of the ju-
venile courts are not considered to be criminal in nature,1 0 and they
too may be conducted without recognizing this provision. But the
defendant must be accorded the right of confrontation in proceedings
before administrative agencies involving criminal sanctions."1
The constitutional right of confrontation was designed to prevent
the conviction of tefendants in criminal cases by the use of ex parte
affadavits and extrajudicial testimony. 12 Therefore, confrontation is
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §35-2 (1943) relates primarily to guardianship of lunatics
and inebriates. Proceedings for commitment to state hospitals for the insane are
had under N. C. GEN. STAT. §§122-42 to 68.1 (1947 Supp.). The clerk of court
may act on sworn affidavits of two physicians. A jury trial is not available under
the commitment provisions. In re Cook, 218 N. C. 384, 11 S. E. 2d 142 (1940).
N. C. Gm. STAT. §§122-75, 79 (1945 Supp.) relate to commitment to private
hospitals. The presence of the lunatic at the hearing before the clerk is not ex-
pressly required by these provisions, nor by those relating to state hospitals. But
see Bethea v. McLennon, 23 N. C. 523, 526 (1841) (Dictum states that denial of
lunatic's right to be present would be grounds for setting aside an inquisition.).
See 5 WIGMoR, Ev DzNcE §1400 (3rd ed. 1940). Wigmore condemns statutes
which allow the hearing to be held in the absence of the alleged lunatic.
'N. C. G, . STAT. §§35-30 to 35 (1943); N. C. GEN. STAT. §35-35.1 (1945
Supp.).
' Contempt proceedings are sid generis. If the contempt is direct summary
punishment may be inflicted. N. C. GEN. STAT. §5-5 (1943) ; State v. Little, 175
N. C. 743, 94 S. E. 680 (1918) ; In re Brown, 168 N. C. 417, 84 S. E. 690 (1915);
Ex parte McCown, 139 N. C. 95, 51 S. E. 957 (1905).
If the contempt is indirect the court makes findings of fact based on testimony
or affidavits. In re Adams, 218 N. C. 379, 11 S. E. 2d 163 (1940) ; In re Walker,
82 N. C. 95 (1880).
Where acts are punishable as for contempt findings of fact are supported by
affidavits. Safie Manufacturing Co. v. Arnold, 228 N. C. 375, 45 S. E. 2d 577;
it re Deaton, 105 N. C. 59, 11 S. E. 244 (1890).
Where the act is an indirect contempt or is punishable as for contempt it is
apparently in the court's discretion to take evidence by affidavit or by testimony
at the hearing on the order to show cause. The cases cited do not hold that the
contemnor may not present testimony at the hearing.
10 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§110-21, 24 (1943) ; State v. Burnett, 179 N. C. 735, 102
S. E. 711 (1920); In re Watson, 157 N. C. 340, 72 S. E. 1049 (1911). The
jurisdictional age limit of the juvenile court is 16 years, unless the child commits
a felony punishable by more than 10 years imprisonment, in which case the age
limit is 14 years. N. C. GEN. STAT. 110-29 (1943) ; State v. Smith, 213 N. C. 299,
195 S. E. 819 (1938).
"' Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) ; Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228 (1895) ; United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1895). See Morgan
v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14, 18 (1938). See Note 28 N. C. L. REv. 85 (1949).
Helvering v. Mitchell, supra at 402, states that "Civil procedure is incompatible
with the accepted rules and constitutional guaranties governing the trial of criminal
prosecutions, and where civil procedure is prescribed for the enforcement of reme-
dial sanctions (by administrative agencies), those rules and guaranties do not
apply ... furthermore, the defendant has no constitutional right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him . . .". The inference, of course, is that if the
agency is enforcing a criminal sanction confrontation must be preserved (italics
supplied).
12 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) ; Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237 (1894) (The Mattox Case is an excellent example of the manner in which
rules of evidence may be shaped to defeat justice. The majority held, first, that
the death of a witness was sufficient ground for admitting his testimony given at
[Vol. 7.8
NOTES AND COMMENTS
regarded as a constitutional embodiment of the common law rule that
the accused is entitled to an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against him.13 This, in effect, preserves principally the defendant's
right to have the common law hearsay rule of evidence enforced. A
derivative, though not insignificant, benefit accruing from the enforce-
ment of the hearsay rule is that witnesses are required to testify in the
presence of the jury and the defendant.' 4 The jury is thus enabled to
form a critical estimate of the witness' credibility as it is affected by
his deportment and demeanor.
Since the common law hearsay rule was not absolute, but subject
to exceptions, defendant's constitutional right to an opportunity to cross-
examine is also subject to exceptions.15 Among the exceptions recog-
nized in North Carolina in criminal cases are: Testimony at former
trial,' 6 dying declarations,' 7 reputation,lS pedigree,' 9 official statements
a prior trial, and, second, that defendant was precluded from impeaching the dead
witness at the second trial by his statements made after the first trial, on the
ground that a proper foundation could not be laid. The latter holding exhibits
more interest in protecting the honor of a deceased witness than in giving a live
defendant a fair trial. This view cannot be too strongly condemned.).
" State v. Perry, 210 N. C.- 796, 188 S. E. 639 (1936) ; State v. Breece, 206
N. C. 92, 173 S. E. 9 (1934) ; State v. Hightower, 187 N. C. 300, 121 S. E. 616
(1924) ; State v. Dixon, 185 N. C. 727, 117 S. E. 170 (1923) ; State v. Thomas,
64N. C. 74 (1870) ; State v. Webb, 2 N. C. 103 (1794). Accord, Mattox v.
United States, supra note 12; 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §1395 (3rd ed. 1940).
The North Carolina Supreme Court has excluded hearsay evidence in a num-
ber of criminal cases without reference to defendant's right of confrontation. See
State v. Kluttz, 206 N. C. 726, 175 S. E. 81 (1934).
The North Carolina view that hearsay may be admitted for the purpose of
corroboration lessens the scope of the constitutional protection. See STANSBURY,
NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§51, 52, and 79.
The State's contentions may be stated in the trial judge's charge to the jury
in such a manner as to infringe upon defendant's right to confrontation. See State
v. Love, 187 N. C. 32, 121 S. E. 20 (1923).
The question as to whether the admission in evidence of a witness' "past recol-
lection recorded" infringes on the right of confrontation has not been decided in
North Carolina. Kinsey v. State, 49 Ariz. 201, 65 P. 2d 1141 (1937) holds that
the admission of such evidence does not impair the right to cross-examine since
the witness may be impeached, and his ability to observe attacked. The witness
has already admitted that he has no present recollection of the facts.
1' State v. Hartsfield, 188 N. C. 357, 124 S. E. 629 (1924) ; State v. Thomas,
supra note 13; 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §1395 (3rd ed. 1940). Wigmore terms it
"demeanor evidence." For a well-stated opinion as to the value of demeanor evi-
dence see Creamer v. Bivert, 214 Mo. 743, 113 S. W. 1118 (1908).
" State v. Dowdy, 145 N. C. 432, 58 S. E. 1002 (1907). Accord, Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1894) ; State v. Springs, 184 N.C. 768, 114 S. E.
851 (1922) ; State v. Behrman, 114 N. C. 797, 19 S. E. 220 (1894) ; 5 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §1397 (3rd ed. 1940).
For an interesting view contra see dissent by Browne, Ch. J., in Blackwell v.
State, 79 Fla. 709, 86 So. 224. 15 A. L. R. 465 (1920).
" State v. Ham, 224 N. C. 128, 29 S. E. 2d 449 (1944) (Testimony given at
habeas corpus proceeding) ; State v. Casey, 204 N. C. 411, 168 S. E. 512 (1933)
(Testimony given at former trial) ; State v. Maynard, 184 N. C. 653, 113 S. E. 682(1922) (Testimony given at preliminary hearing); STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE §146 (1946). Cf. State v. Levy, 187 N. C. 581, 122 S. E. 386 (1924)
(Defendant proffered evidence given at former trial. Witness had died pending
second trial. Stenographer remembered direct testimony of dead witness but had
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and certificates, 20 entries in the regular course of business,21 res gestae,22
verbal acts,23 statements of mental and physical condition,24 statements
of intent,2 5 and spontaneous exclamations. 20 Further, the attitude
generally prevails that the constitutional provision did not solidify the
common law exceptions, but that other exceptions might be developed. 27
This view, of course, should not be followed to the point of extinguish-
ing the rule by the exceptions. Inherent limitations imposed by the
intendment of the provision should be recognized.28
Defendant is entitled by confrontation to present such defense as he
may have by producing evidence in his own behalf,29 as distinguished
forgotten cross-examination by State. Held; Proper to exclude evidence offered.
All must be offered or none will be admitted.)
" State v. Debnam, 222 N. C. 266, 22 S. E. 2d 562 (1942) ; State v. Puett,210 N. C. 633, 188 S. E. 75 (1936) ; State v. Wallace, 203 N. C. 284, 165 S. E.
716 (1932) (This exception applies only to prosecutions for homicide.).
18 State v. Harrill, 224 N. C. 477, 31 S. E. 2d 353 (1944) ; State v. Miller,
224 N. C. 228, 29 S. E. 2d 751 (1944) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-206 (1943) ; STANS-
BURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §148 (1946).
1 State v. Trippe, 222 N. C. 600, 24 S. E. 2d 340 (1943) ; State v. Hairston,121 N. C. 579, 28 S. E. 492 (1897); STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §149(1946).
20 State v. Dowdy, 145 N. C. 432, 58 S. E. -1002 (1907) ; State v. Morris, 84N. C. 757 (1881); STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§153, 154 (1946).
Cf. State v. Blakeney, 194 N. C. 651, 140 S. E. 433 (1927).
" State v. Lippard, 223 N. C. 167, 25 S. E. 2d 594 (1943), cert. denied 320 U. S.749 (1943); State v. Shipman, 202 N. C. 518, 163 S. E. 657 (1932). Contra:
State v. Thomas, 64 N. C. 74 (1870).
22 State v. Carraway, 181 N. C. 561, 107 S. E. 142 (1921) ; State v. Davis,177 N. C. 573, 98 S. E. 785 (1919) ; STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §158(1946).2
' State v. Davis, supra note 22; State v. Worthington, 64 N. C. 594 (1870);
State v. Huntley, 25 N. C. 418 (1843) ; STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE§159 (1946).24 State v. Lagerholm, 208 N. C. 195, 179 S. E. 644 (1935) ; State v. Jeffreys,192 N. C. 318, 135 S. E. 32 (1926); State v. Prytle, 191 N. C. 698, 132 S. E.
785 (1926) ; State v. Cooper, 170 N. C. 719, 87 S. E. 50 (1915) ; State v. Draughon,
151 N. C. 677, 65 S. E. 913 (1909) ; STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §161(1946). Cf. State v. Hargrave, 97 N. C. 457, 1 S. E. 774 (1887).
2" State v. Rice, 222 N. C. 634, 24 S. E. 2d 483 (1943) ; State v. Bowser, 214N. C. 249, 199 S. E. 31 (1938) ; State v. Lagerholm, supra note 24; State v. Bry-
son, 60 N. C. 477 (1864); STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §161 (1946).Contra; State v. Skidmore, 87 N. C. 509 (1882).
2 State v. Dills, 204 N . C. 33, 167 S. E. 459 (1932) ; State v. McCourry, 128N. C. 594, 38 S. E. 883 (1901); STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §164(1946).
27 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934); State v. Dowdy, 145N. C. 432, 436 58 S. E. 1002, 1004 (1907) ; 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §1397 (3rd ed.
1940). Contra : Salinger v. United States, 272 U. S. 542, 548 (1926) ("The pur-
pose of that provision, this Court often has said, is to continue and preserve that
right, and not to broaden it or disturb the exceptions.").
N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-206 (1943) is an example of legislative creation of ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule. State v. Barrett, 138 N. C. 630, 50 S. E. 506 (1905)
discusses the power of the Legislature to create new rules of evidence.
28 Wigmore's principles of exceptions to the hearsay rule, "necessity" and "cir-
cumstantial probability of trustworthiness," might here be adopted to secure con-
formance to the purposes of the constitutional provision. 5 WIGMIORE, EVIDENCE§§1420-1422 (3rd ed. 1940).
2" State v. Farrell, 223 N. C. 321, 28 S. E. 2d 560 (1943) ; State v. Utley, 223
N. C. 39, 25 S. E. 2d 195 (1943).
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from, and in addition to, the right to test any testimony produced on
behalf of the State by cross-examination. Indeed, a literal interpreta-
tion of the constitutional phraseology would seem to emphasize de-
fendant's right to bring in his own evidence for the purposes of contra-
dicting the testimony produced by the State and establishing affirmative
defenses rather than his right to test incriminating testimony.3o Two
of the earlier North Carolina cases, while not denying that confronta-
tion preserved defendant's right to cross-examine State's witnesses, took
this view.3 ' The shift in emphasis from presenting the defense to cross-
examination comes with later cases. However, it should not be sup-
posed that confrontation exempts the defendant from the application of
the usual rules of evidence in presenting his defense. The blade has
two edges. The State is also entitled to test defendant's witnesses by
cross-examination.3 2
Not only does defendant's right to confront witnesses require that
the hearsay rule be enforced, but it also requires that defendant be al-
lowed a reasonable time, as determined by the facts of the particular
case, to prepare his defense.33  This question is generally raised by a
motion for continuance. Ordinarily the action taken on such motion
rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not be reversed
in the absence of abuse of discretion. 34 But when it is claimed that a
constitutional right has been denied by refusal to grant a continuance
the question presented is one of law and is reviewable on appeal.3 5
Confrontation, in this respect, duplicates the constitutional right to coun-
sel,36 but the protection thus afforded is not merely cumulative since
the right to an opportunity to prepare his defense is preserved whether
"N. C. Coxsr., Art. I, §11 (1868) (".. . with other testimony . . .").
"State v. Tilghman, 33 N. C. 513 (1850); State v. Sparrow, 7 N. C. 487(1819).
" State v. English, 201 N. C. 295, 159 S. E. 318 (1931), Note, 10 N. C. L. Rv.
84 (1931) (Confession by third party excluded.) ; State v. Collins, 189 N. C. 15, 126
S. E. 98 (1924) (Statement by third party of defendant's willingness to surrender
excluded.) ; State v. Levy, 187 N. C. 581, 122 S. E. 386 (1924) (Evidence given
at former trial excluded because witness unable to remember State's cross-exam-
ination.) ; State v. Beverly, 88 N. C. 632 (1883) (Evidence of conviction of third
party for same crime excluded.).
" State v. Farrell, 223 N. C. 321, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943) ; State v. Utley, 223
N. C. 39, 25 S. E. 2d 195 (1943) ; State v. Whitfield, 206 N. C. 696, 175 S. E.
93, cert. denied, 293 U. S. 556 (1934) ; State v. Garner, 203 N. C. 361, 166 S. E.
180 (1932) ; State v. Ross, 193 N. C. 25, 136 S. E. 193 (1926).
This subject has previously been discussed in respect to the right to counsel.
Note, 27 N. C. L. Rav. 544 (1949). What was there said will not be reiterated
here.
" State v. Henderson, 216 N. C. 99, 3 S. E. 2d 357 (6939) ; State v. Green,
207 N. C. 369, 177 S. E. 120 (1934) ; State v. Whitfield, mupra note 37; State v.
Rhodes, 202 N. C. 101, 161 S. E. 722 (1931); State v. Sauls, 190 N. C. 810, 130
S. E. 848 (1925).
"State v. Gibson, 229 N. C. 497, 50 S. E. 2d 520 (1948) ; State v. Farrell,
223 N. C. 321, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943) ; State v. Jones, 206 N. C. 812, 175 S. E.
188 (1934) ; State v. Garner, 203 N. C. 361, 166 S. E. 180 (1932).
N. C. CoNsr., Art. I, §11 (1868).
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the accused employs counsel, the court assigns him counsel, or whether
he conducts his own defense.3 7
Additional protection is derived from confrontation in its assurance
to defendant that he may not be tried and convicted in absentia. 88 This
assurance that he may be present extends to the selection of the jury, 0
the reception of evidence, 40 the argument of counsel, 41 the charge to the
jury,42 the reception of the verdict,48 and the imposition of sentence, 44
but not to the return of the indictment in open court, 4" the argument on
motions for a new trial and similar motions,46 or the hearing on appeal
in the Supreme Court.4 7 In cases involving capital felonies the presence
of the accused is required at every step of the actual trial and cannot
be waived, either personally or by counsel.4 s In trials for felonies less
" Cf. State v. Hedgebeth, 228 N. C. 259, 45 S. E. 2d 563 (1947), aff'd, Hedge-
beth v. North Carolina, 334 U. S. 806 (1948) (On procedural grounds). On
principle, State v. Hedgebeth seems erroneous.
"' State v. O'Neal, 197 N. C. 548, 149 S. E. 860 (1929) ; State v. Hartsfield,
188 N. C. 357, 124 S. E. 629 (1924) ; State v. Freeze, 170 N. C. 710, 86 S. E. 1000(1915) ; State v. Cherry, 154 N. C. 624, 70 S. E. 294 (1911) ; State v. Kelly, 97
S. E. 404, 2 S. E. 185 (1887) ; State v. Jenkins, 84 N. C. 812, 37 Am. Rep. 643(1881) ; State v. Blackwelder, 61 N. C. 38 (1886) ; State v. Craton, 28 N. C. 164(1845).
" State v. Dry, 152 N. C. 813, 67 S. E. 1000 (1910).
40 While there are no North Carolina cases directly in point, the solicitude of
the Court in protecting the accused's right to be present at other stages of the trial
warrants the inference that a jury view would constitute taking evidence and that
defendant would have the right to be present. Note, 12 N. C. L. Rv. 267 (1934).
See State v. Perry, 121 N. C. 533, 27 S. E. 997 (1897) ; Cf. State v. Stewart, 189
N. C. 340, 127 S. E. 260 (1925).
6 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE §1803 (3rd ed. 1940) takes a contrary view to the effect
that a jury view does not constitute taking evidence.
" State v. Pierce, 123 N. C. 745, 31 S. E. 847 (1898) ; State v. Paylor, 89 N. C.
539 (1883).
" State v. Hardee, 192 N. C. 533, 135 S. E. 345 (1926) ; State v. Matthews, 191
N. C. 378, 131 S. E. 743 (1926) ; State v. Sheets, 89 N. C. 543 (1883) ; State v.
Blackwelder, 61 N. C. 38 (1866).
, "' State v. O'Neal, 197 N. C. 548, 149 S. E. 860 (1929) ; State v. Freeze, 170
N. C. 710, 86 S. E. 1000 (1915) ; State v. Jenkins, 84 N. C. 813 (1881) ; State v.
Epps, 76 N. C. 55 (1877). Cf. State v. Austin, 108 N. C. 780, 13 S. E. 219 (1891).
In capital cases the trial judge cannot delegate to the clerk the duty to receive
the verdict in the judge's absence. See State v. Bazemore, 193 N. C. 366, 137
S. E. 172 (1927).
"State v. Brooks, 211 N. C. 702, 191 S. E. 749 (1937) ; State v. Cherry, 154
N. C. 624, 70 S. E. 294 (1911) ; State v. Kelly, 97 N. C. 404, 2 S. E. 185 (1887).
"State v. Stanley, 227 N. C. 650, 44 S. E. 2d 196 (1947).
"See State v. Hartsfield, 188 N. C. 357, 360, 124 S. E. 629, 631 (1924) ; State
v. Dry, 152 N. C. 813, 814, 67 S. E. 1000, 1001 (1910).
,' State v. Dalton, 185 N. C. 606, 115 S. E. 881 (1923) ; State v. DeVane, 166
N. C. 281, 81 S. E. 293 (1914) ; State v. Moses, 149 N. C. 581, 63 S. E. 68 (1908);
State v. Jacobs, 107 N. C. 772, 11 S. E. 962 (1890).
When the defendant becomes a fugitive pending appeal the Supreme Court may,
in its discretion, hear the appeal, dismiss the appeal on motion by the State, or
continue the case from term to term.
" State v. Matthews, 191 N. C. 378, 131 S. E. 743 (1926) ; State v. Dry, 152
N. C. 812, 67 S. E. 1000 (1910) ; State v. Blackwelder, 61 N. C. 38 (1866). But
cf. State v. Hardee, 192 N. C. 533, 135 S. E. 345 (1926) (Verdict of "murder in
the second degree" cured any error. Rule is to be applied only when verdict is
"guilty of murder in the first degree.") and State v. Trull, 169 N. C. 363, 85 S. E.
133 (1915) (Defendant under influence of opiates during trial of capital offense.).
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than capital the right can be waived by defendant personally.49 In
misdemeanor cases the right to be present may be waived personally
or by counsel. 50 Notwithstanding the rules as to waiver, no valid sen-
tence imposing corporal punishment may be rendered in the absence of
the accused. 5 '
Actual physical presence, alone, is insufficient. Confrontation de-
mands mental, as well as physical, presence.52 The most frequent
causes of mental absence are insanity, deafness, and inability to under-
stand the English language. A defendant who is insane at the time of
the trial may not be tried.53 Deafness and inability to understand Eng-
lish, however, do not prevent a trial of accused, consistently with his
right of confrontation, if adequate steps are taken to assure his mental
presence. 54 It would seem preferable, when it appears to the trial court
that such action is necessary, to require the court to furnish such means
of communication as is needed to enable defendant to understand the
proceedings, 5  in the absence of a prior express waiver. 56 Analytically,
the rules of waiver applicable to mental presence should conform to those
applicable to physical presence. But since physical presence is a mate-
rial, tangible fact, and in many cases mental presence is not, greater
" State v. Freeze, 170 N. C. 710, 86 S. E. 1000 (1915) ; State v. Cherry, 154
N. C. 624, 70 S. E. 294 (1911) ; State v. Kelly, 97 N. C. 404, 2 S. E. 185 (1887).
State v. Freeze supra, and State v. Cherry supra, state the rule to the effect
that counsel, in less than capital felony cases, cannot waive accused's right to be
present "unless expressly authorized thereto."
Dicta in State v. Matthews, supra note 48 and State v. Dry, supra note 48
state the rule to the effect that only defendant may waive the right. Accord, State
v. Pierce, 123 N. C. 745, 31 S. E. 847 (1898) (By implication).
"0 State v. O'Neal, 197 N. C. 548, 149 S. E. 860 (1929) ; See State v. Matthews,
191 N. C. 378, 384, 131 S. E. 743, 747 (1926).
"' State v. Brooks, 211 N. C. 702, 191 S. E. 749 (1937) ; State v. Cherry, 154
N. C. 624, 70 S. E. 294 (1911); State v. Paylor, 89 N. C. 539 (1883). Cf. State
v. Kelly, 97 N. C. 404, 2 S. E. 185 (1887) (Defendant fled as the jury was re-
turning to court with the verdict. The verdict was received but no sentence im-
posed. Several months later defendant was arrested and sentenced to corporal
punishment under the original verdict. Held: Affirmed.).
" Garcia v. State,-Tex.-, 210 S. W. 2d 574 (1948) ; State v. Vasquez, 101
Utah 444, 121 P. 2d 903 (1942), Note, 16 So. CAu.IF. L. Rav. 56 (1942) ; Terry v.
State, 21 Ala. App. 100, 105 So. 386 (1925), Note, 24 Micm. L. Rav. 305 (1926) ;
The King v. Lee Kun (1916), 1 K. B. 337, 9 B. R1 C. 1121. Cf. Marker v. State,
25 Ala. App. 91, 142 So. 105, cert. denied, 225 Ala. 141, 142 So. 108 (1932), Note,
66 U. S. L. Rav. 523 (1932).
"2 State v. Vann, 84 N. C. 722 (1881) ; State v. Harris, 53 N. C. 136 (1860);
Ashley v. Pescor, 147 F. 2d 318 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Howie v. State, 121 Miss. 197,
83 So. 158 (1919). See People v. Perry, 14 Cal. 2d 387, -, 94 P. 2d 559, 564
(1939).
* The cases cited in note 52 vtpra decide this point by implication.
"n Such a course has been adopted in the Superior Court and approved by the
North Carolina Supreme Court. See State v. Early, 211 N. C. 189, 189 S. E. 668
(1936).
Evidence received through an interpreter is not hearsay. State v. Hamilton,
42 La. App. 1204, 8 So. 304 (1890).
" Contra: Gonzalez v. People, 109 F. 2d 215 (3rd Cir. 1940) (Waived by
failure to insist on right to interpreter).
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care should be exercised to determine whether an intelligent waiver of
the right to be mentally present has been made.57 To dispel doubt,
the waiver required should be express and before the jury has been
selected.
It not infrequently occurs that a conflict arises between the right of
confrontation and the various privileges of witnesses. The issue in such
case is whether the right to confront is paramount or is subject to such
privileges. In the North Carolina case of State v. Perry5 8 a conflict
arose between confrontation and the constitutional right to refuse to
give self-incriminating testimony. It was held reversible error to refuse
to strike the direct. testimony after the witness claimed the privilege, on
the ground that the right to confront is a right to inquire freely and
fully into any relevant subject matter. A defendant claiming a consti-
tutional right should not be prejudiced by half-truths. 'This decision is
sound, and the principle should be applied regardless of the nature of
the privilege claimed 59 and regardless of the status of the witness,
whether he is a co-defendant, is to be separately tried, or is otherwise
disinterested.
The importance of State v. Perry lies in its limitation of prior de-
cisions to the effect that co-defendants are competent and compellable
to testify, though they may not be required to incriminate themselves.
The result of this case is that witnesses, including co-defendants, may
be required to testify"0 by the State,(1 but if a privilege is claimed by
a witness on cross-examination defendant is entitled as of right to have
the direct examination striken.62
As is true with various other protective devices, defendant may
waive his right to confrontation "By express consent, by failure to assert
it in apt time, or by conduct inconsistent with a purpose to insist upon
it."' 63 This observation is subject to the qualification previously noted
of the requirement of defendant's presence at a trial for a capital offense.
"' It is not intended here to intimate that no duty devolves upon counsel to call
the court's attention to accused's physical or mental defects. Of course, when
accused has no counsel the burden should be on the court to protect his rights in
this respect.
58210 N. C. 796, 188 S. E. 639 (1936).
: State v. Condry, 50 N. C. 418 (1858) (Attorney-client privilege disallowed).
'o State v. Howard, 222 N. C. 291, 22 S. E. 2d 917 (1942) ; State v. Smith, 86
N. C. 705 (1882). See also N. C. GEir. STAT. §§8-50, 54 (1943).
" But defendant may not insist that a co-defendant testify in his behalf if the
co-defendant claims a privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Medley, 178N. C. 710, 100 S. E. 591 (1919). This view likewise preserves both constitutional
rights.
'2 Cf. State v. Weaver, 93 N. C. 595 (1885) ("It was not good ground of ex-
ception that the court told the co-defendant witness 'That he need not answer anyquestion which tended to criminate himself.' ")
08 State v. Hartsfield, 188 N. C. 357, 360, 124 S. E. 629, 631 (1924). Accord,State v. Harris, 181 N. C. 600, 107 S. E. 466 (1921) ; State v. Mitchell, 119 N. C.
784, 25 S. E. 783 (1896) ; Gonzalez v. People, 109 F. 2d 215 (3rd Cir. 1940).
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The recent North Carolina case of State v. Gibson64 retreats from
the commendable position taken by State v. Farrell6" in regard to consti-
tutional rights and revives the doctrine of prejudicial error. Though
State v. Gibson involved the constitutional right to counsel the applica-
tion of the doctrine to confrontation may be deduced since the two
rights are closely interwoven. The clearest statement of the doctrine
is to be found in State v. Bea 66 wherein it is said that, "The foundation
for the application (for) a new trial is the allegation of injustice arising
from error, but for which a different result would likely have ensued.
. . . Unless, therefore, some wrong has been suffered, there is nothing
to relieve against. The injury must be positive and tangible, and not
merely theoretical." Obviously, the question of prejudice cannot arise
unless a denial of a right has been assumed without deciding, conceded,
or proved, hence such denial itself is only a theoretical injury. Two
criticisms may be made in regard to this doctrine. The first is that,
logically, the doctrine would sanction a star-chamber proceeding if de-
fendant were in fact guilty. In this aspect the doctrine is a negation
of the concept that the Declaration of Rights guarantees to every man
a fair and just trial. The denial of a fair trial should, of itself, be suf-
ficient prejudice. The second criticism is that an erroneous proceeding
deprives defendant of his presumption of innocence, which loss, under
the doctrine as stated, is not an actual, but merely theoretical injury.6 7
The justification most frequently advanced for the application of this
doctrine is the public interest in certain and prompt punishment of
criminals. The public interest is not a stable compass when compared
with the Declaration of Rights. Further, the Court seems to overlook
the fact that the public has a counterbalancing interest in securing to
the accused his constitutional rights and that it was the purpose of the
Declaration of Rights to secure to the individual rights as against the
public.
The approach of State v. Farrell68 is to be preferred. There the
view is taken that, "Whether his defense before a jury after full prepa-
ration would have availed him is for the present purpose immaterial.
The law provides one mode of trial and it is the same for the innocent
and for the guilty." The distinction between the approach of State v.
0,229 N. C. 497, 50 S. E. 2d 520 (1948).
O,223 N. C. 361, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943).00 199 N. C. 278, 303, 154 S. E. 604, 618 (1930). Accord, State v. Heavener,
168 N. C. 156, 83 S. E. 732 (1914) ; State v. Smith, 164 N. C. 475, 79 S. E. 979
(1913).
"' This criticism of the doctrine has previously been made. Note, 27 N. C. L.
REv. 544 (1949).
0- 223 N. C. 321, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943). The North Carolina Supreme Court
has shown no inclination to accord State v. Farrell sympathetic treatment. See
State v. Hedgebeth, 228 N. C. 259, 265, 45 S. E. 2d 563, 567 (1947), aff'd Hedge-
beth v. North Carolina, 334 U.S. 806 (1948).
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Gibson69 and that of State v. Farrell lies in the purposes for which the
facts in the record are analyzed. In State v. Gibson the purpose is to
determine whether defendant has been prejudiced. The purpose in
State v. Farrell is to determine whether error has been committed. The
one focuses attention on the injury suffered, the other on the nature of
the constitutional provision in question. "You were not denied the
right" is a better answer to a claim of right than "You fail to show us
that the denial injured you."
Despite frequent and vigorous dissents, the United States Supreme
Court has uniformly refused to hold that the due process clause of the
14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution incorporates the Bill of
Rights as restraints on state action.7 0 Instead, the due process clause
is interpreted to impose federal prohibition on state deprivation of only
those rights which may be considered of ". . . The very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty,"' rl or as ". . . Principle(s) of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental." 72 It has not been squarely held that confrontation is
essential to due process, 73 but dicta in Snyder v. Massachusetts74 indi-
cate that, insofar as it assures an adequate opportunity to be heard and
the presence of the prisoner at the trial, it is considered fundamental.
To the extent that confrontation duplicates the right to counsel, this
protection may also be inferred from the decisions in the right to coun-
sel cases.
The procedure of the United States Supreme Court in appraising
the facts of each case and applying a subjective interpretation of due
process thereto75 has made the task of prognostication a matter of
chimerical surmise for the state courts, 7 6 and few objective criteria are
perceivable.
A pragmatical approach to constitutional rights, as exemplified by
the doctrine of prejudicial error, is not to be desired. In the effort to
60 229 N. C. 497, 50 S. E. 2d 520 (1948).7 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1946) (Black, Douglas, Murphy, and
Rutledge dissenting); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1944); Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1941) (Black, Douglas, and Rutledge dissenting); Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
"' Palko v. Connecticut, at 325, supra note 70.
72 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1933).
"' West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1903) (The question was here presented
but not decided.).
71 Supra note 72, at 105 ("What may not be taken away is notice of the charge
and an adequate opportunity to be heard in defense of it.").
" Green, The Bill of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendnent and the Supreme
Court, 46 MIcH. L. REV. 869 (1948). (Professor Green thinks this procedure is
"... The purest and most absolute form of arbitrary and uncontrolled power, a
retreat into the deepest jungle of natural law, from the clearing which the Bill of
Rights has created." Id. at 900.).
, Newman v. State, 148 Tex. Cr. App. 645, 652, 187 S. W. 2d 559, 563 (1945)
("If the Supreme Court would prescribe some formula by which we may be
guided, our task would be much easier .. .').
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dispense criminal justice the means by which that end is to be achieved
are worth considering, as well as the end itself. Procedural due process
requires that the rules of evidence be shaped to conform to a sound
conception of the protective devices of the Constitution rather than
altering the concept to fit the rules. In the event the concept appears
outmoded change should be made through the prescribed procedure,
constitutional amendment, rather than by legislative or judicial erosion.77
MARSHALL B. SHERMIN, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-Interpleader Act-Diversity
Requirements-Co-Citizenship of Claimants
The Federal Interpleader Act,' provides that the district courts of
the United States shall have original jurisdiction of bills of interpleader
and bills in the nature of interpleader 2 if "(i) Two or more adverse
'7 However no objection can be made to judicial or legislative prescription of
the minima of protection secured by constitutional rights. Chapter 112 N. C. Sess.
L. (1949) is to be commended as a step in the right direction. The Legislature
might well consider statutory authority for the State to take and use depositions
in criminal cases, preserving accused's right to cross-examine deponent when the
deposition is taken.
128 U. S. C. §41 (26) (1936). Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936,
45 YALE L. J. 963, 1161 (1936). There has been a slight change in the wording
of the diversity requirement by 28 U. S. C. §1335 (1948). It now reads: "(i)
Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in 1332 of this
title. . . ." The Reviser's Notes to §1335 do not indicate that any change in the
requirement was meant to be effected by this change in phraseology and the sub-
stituted language does not seem to require a change therein.
2 Interpleader was a remedy which developed in the equity courts. It would
lie only if-(l) The same debt, duty or thing was claimed by all parties against
whom relief was demanded; (2) All adverse titles or claims were dependent upon
or derived from a common source; (3) The person seeking the relief did not have
or claim any interest in the subject matter; (4) The person seeking the relief was
a stakeholder, standing perfectly indifferent between the claimants.
Later, a plaintiff was permitted to bring a bill in the nature of interpleader,
though he claimed an interest in the subject-matter, did not admit all of the de-
fendants' claims or the defendants claimed different amounts (and hence strict
interpleader would not lie) if there was some basis for equitable jurisdiction other
than double liability or vexation. Both bills of interpleader and bills in the nature
of interpleader can be obtained under 28 U. S. C. §41(1) (1936) as amended by
28 U. S. C. §1332 (1948), as any other civil action and are subject to the limita-
tions therein (i.e. the sum in controversy must exceed $3,000, exclusive of interest
and costs; process may be served only within the territorial limits of the state in
which the district court is held; there must be diversity between plaintiff stake-
holder and defendant claimants; the only proper venue is the judicial district in
which all the plaintiffs or all the defendants reside). The Interpleader Act (szVpra
note 1) also permits bills of interpleader and bills in the nature of interpleader but
the relief is thereby made more accessible by: (1) making the crucial diversity
of citizenship that among the adverse claimants; (2) reducing jurisdictional amount
to $500; (3) allowing process to run throughout the United States; (4) making
the district where one or more of the claimants resides or reside a proper venue;
(5) allowing the suit to be entertained though the titles or claims of the adverse
claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical but adverse to and
independent of each other. 2 Mooa's FEDERAL PA=c .C §§22.02, 22.03 (1938).
See Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YALE L. J. 804 (1921).
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claimants, citizens of different states, are claiming to be entitled to such
money or property.. . ." The federal courts have been confronted with
a variety of situations in which it has been necessary to determine
whether or not jurisdiction exists under this section.
Situation 1. S stakeholder, citizen of State W, is contesting none
of the claims involved. He brings interpleader against Claimant 1 of
State X and Claimant 2 of State Y. The federal courts have jurisdic-
tion under the Act.3 This situation presents no jurisdictional problem
because whether diversity between the stakeholder and the claimants
or diversity between the claimants be required, it is present.
Situation 2. S stakeholder, citizen of State W, is contesting none
of the claims involved. He brings interpleader against Claimant 1 of
State X, Claimant 2 of State X, and Claimant 3 of State Y. The fed-
eral courts take jurisdiction.4 In this group of cases the problem of
whether co-citizenship among some of the claimants defeats jurisdiction
under the Act is encountered. The courts have taken jurisdiction in
these cases without -difficulty. Here there is an apparent conflict with
the requirement of complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all de-
fendants pronounced by Strawbridge v. Curtis5 as a prerequisite to
jurisdiction of the federal courts in other controversies between citizens
of different states. Since the stakeholder here is of a different citizen-
ship from all the claimants, it might be said that the requirement of
that case was satisfied, in fact, though the Interpleader Act as construed
in Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.6 did not require such diversity.
Situation 3. S stakeholder, citizen of State W, is contesting none
of the claims involved. He brings interpleader against Claimant 1 of
State W, Claimant 2 of State X, and Claimant 3 of State X. It is held
that the requisite diversity of citizenship is present,7 even though com-
plete diversity of citizenship is absent. In fact some of the claimants
are co-citizens, and even if the citizenship of the stakeholder be con-
sidered it would be found that he was a co-citizen of one of the claimants.
Situation 4. S stakeholder, citizen of State W, is contesting part of
the conflicting claims against him. He brings a bill in the nature of
'Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Weinress, 47 F. Supp. 626 (N. D. Ill.
1942) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Skov, 45 F. Supp. 140 (D. C. Ore. 1942);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 27 F. Supp. 791 (W. D. La. 1939).
( Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U.S. 414 (1936), affirming 82 F. 2d 953
(5th Cir.) ; Roberts v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 94 F. 2d 277 (7th Cir. 1938) ;
Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Irwin, 82 F. Supp. 180 (N. D. Ga. 1948); Blackmar v.
Mackay, 65 F. Supp. 48 (S. D. N. Y. 1946); American Banking Co. v. Albert &
D. Pipe Corp., 52 F. Supp. 486 (D. C. N. J. 1943).
' 3 Cranch 267 (1806). a308 U.S. 66 (1939).
'Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); Cramer v. Phoenix
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 91 F. 2d 141 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 739(1937), rehearing denied, 302 U.S. 779 (1937); Girard Trust Co. v. Vance, 5
F. R. D. 109 (E. D. Pa. 1946); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Puget Sound Co., 47
F. Supp. 43 (W. D. N. Y. 1942).
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interpleader against Claimant 1 of State X and Claimant 2 of State Y.
The courts take jurisdiction. 8 There is no problem here because there
is complete diversity whether or not the stakeholder's citizenship be
considered.
Situation 5. S stakeholder, citizen of State W, is contesting part
of the conflicting claims against him. He brings a bill in the nature
of interpleader against Claimant 1 of State X, Claimant 2 of State X,
and Claimant 3 of State Y. The courts will take jurisdiction.9 The
reasoning in Situation 2 supra relative to the co-citizenship of claimants
is even more strongly applicable here. For it would be unrealistic to
treat the plaintiff stakeholder as a nominal party, whose citizenship is
immaterial for purposes of diversity of citizenship, when he is denying
a part of the claimed liability throughout the case.
In United States et al. v. Sentinel Fire Ins. Co.,1o stakeholder insur-
ance' companies (all of different citizenship from all of the claimants but
of what citizenship does not appear in the report of the case) brought
a bill in the nature of interpleader under the Federal Interpleader Act
against six claimants of Mississippi and one claimant of Illinois. Stake-
holders denied liability in part. The question of the jurisdiction of the
court was raised. It was held by a majority of a five judge court of
appeals that requisite diversity of citizenship was present, fulfilling the
Constitutional requirement of a controversy between citizens of different
states, because plaintiffs were staying in the case to resist some recovery
by part of the claimants and they were of diverse citizenship from all
claimants. The court further expressly held that there was sufficient
diversity among the claimants, disregarding the citizenship of the plain-
tiffs. The two dissenting judges postulated that the Interpleader Act
required complete diversity as set forth in Strawbridge v. Curtis. More-
over, they contended that all claimants must be realigned according to
interest. The effect of following the view of the dissenters would be
to establish two basic conflicting interests in each case. All claimants
of one interest would have to be of different citienship from all claimants
of the other interest in order to meet diversity requirements for federal
interpleader jurisdiction. The authorities are opposed to this.11
' Standard Surety Co. v. Baker, 105 F. 2d 578 (8th Cir. 1939) ; John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kegan, 22 F. Supp. 326 (D. C. Md. 1938).
0 Railway Express Agency v. Jones, 106 F. 2d 341 (7th Cir. 1939).
' - F. 2d - (5th Cir. 1949).
" In the following cases jurisdiction was assumed under the Interpleader Act,
though those claimants who were co-citizens had conflicting interests: Railway
Express Agency v. Jones, 106 F. 2d 341 (7th Cir. 1939) ; Standard Surety Co. v.
Baker, 105 F. 2d 578 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Roberts v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 94
F. 2d 277 (7th Cir. 1938) ; Cramer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 91 F. 2d 141
(8th Cir. 1937) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 27 F. Supp. 791 (W.
D. La. 1938). This principle was recognized in American Indemnity Co. v. Hale,
71 F. Supp. 529 (W. D. Mo. 1947) but interpleader was refused on the merits.
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The principal case falls within Situation 5 supra12 where jurisdiction
is normally taken.13 It is apparent that it is easier to justify jurisdiction
in a case falling within Situation 5 than in one which comes within
Situation 2 or 3 because in Situation 5 the diverse citizenship of the
stakeholder may be used to support jurisdiction. In Situations 2 and 3
there is not this strong jurisdictional support because in Situation 2 the
stakeholder might be regarded as a nominal party since he is not con-
testing any of the claims. In Situation 3 the diverse citizenship of the
stakeholder is not available at all because the stakeholder is a co-citizen
of some of the claimants.
The dissent raises again the question whether the courts should
require complete diversity among adverse claimants before taking juris-
diction under the Interpleader Act. The language of the Act itself does
not require such interpretation.i 4 Subsection (b) seems to contemplate
that some of the claimants may be co-citizens, for it provides: "Such
a suit may be brought in the district court of the district in which one
or more of such claimants resides or reside." Further, the Supreme
Court has held that the Act, thus interpreted, is not unconstitutional."5
Such a result squares with the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtis if looked
at in the light of certain observations of Professor Chafee. He suggests
that that case involved statutory, not constitutional, interpretation and
did not mean that the Constitution did not permit the federal courts to
have jurisdiction where there was not complete diversity of citizenship,
but merely meant that Congress, by the statute involved, had not so
implemented the constitutional grant of power. He further argues that
even though the statute being construed in that case was in ipsis verbis
with the provision in the Constitution for jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts in controversies between citizens of different states,10 the inter-
pretation of the statute should not be determinative of the interpretation
of the provision of the Constitution because a constitutional provision
is fundamental and intended to be more lasting than a statute.'1
Persuasive arguments support a policy of opening wide the doors
of the federal courts to interpleader. Claimants cannot be forced to
become parties to interpleader in a state court unless personal service
of process is obtained upon them within that state because the remedy
is not treated as in rem.' 8  Where complex, interstate businesses such
" Writing for the United States Supreme Court in Treinies v. Sunshine Mining
Co., Mr. Justice Reed expressly left open the question involved in the principal
case. He wrote: "Diversity requirements for federal equity jurisdiction to avoid
a multiplicity of suits from diverse claimants with claims contested by the debtor(are) not involved." 308 U.S. 66, 72 (1939).
" Railway Express Agency v. Jones, 106 F. 2d 341 (7th Cir. 1939).
"28 U. S. C. §1335 (1948).
"Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, §2.
17 Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L. J. 377 (1940).
Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N. Y. 325, 130 N. E. 366 (1921).
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as insurance are involved it will be a rare case indeed where all claimants
can be personally served with process within one state. Thus, the only
way that the stakeholder can be sure that he is protecting himself is to
bring suit in the federal courts under the Interpleader Act, thereby
making possible service of process anywhere in the United States.' 9
The liberal construction placed by the federal courts upon the diversity
requirements of the Act is salutary. It would be tragic indeed if the
remedial effect envisaged in reducing the jurisdictional amount, allow-
ing process to run throughout the United States, liberalizing venue
provisions, and abolishing the historical requirements that the claims
be identical and have a common origin,20 should be practically annihi-
lated in a narrow construction of the diversity provisions of the Act.
MAX OLIVER COGBURN.
Future Interests-Rule of Convenience in Class Gifts
In a recent North Carolina case' the following clause of a will was
before the court for interpretation:
"ITEM V 'I will, devise, and bequeath to my beloved
nephews2 and any other children who may be borne to Robert
and Peg Cole, my house and lot at 301 Fayetteville together with
the contents, and the lot west of the home on Fayetteville Road.' "
At the time of the execution of the will Robert and Peg had three
children and at the testator's death, almost three years after the execu-
tion, there was a fourth child en ventre sa mere. The court was called
upon to decide what children of Robert and Peg should be included in
the gift. Should the gift go only to those three in esse at the testator's
'death and to the fourth en ventre sa mere or should it include also all
children born to Robert and Peg after the testator's death? The court
held that the roll was not to be called until the possibility of any further
issue was extinct by reason of the death of Robert or Peg.
The general rule for the determination of the members of a class
where the gift is immediate3 is that only those members in esse or en yen-
tre sa mere at the testator's death may take under the gift and any per-
sons who fit the description of the class but are born after the testator's
death are excluded unless the clear intention of the testator is shown to
1028 U. S. C. §2361 (1948).
o See note 2 supra.
1 Cole v. Cole, 229 N. C. 757, 51 S. E. 2d 491 (1948).
- Robert and Peg Cole were testator's nephew and niece. The court interpreted
the word "Nephews" to mean "grand-nephews."
'A gift is immediate where the conveyor, having present ownership of the
subject matter limits the corpus thereof to designated groups, annexing no condi-
tion precedent, interposing no period of time before enjoyment and creating no
interest prior to that of the takers. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, EXPLANATORY NOTE
§294 (1940).
1950]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
include them.4 This is known as the rule of convenience5 and is almost0
universally accepted. The court in the present case recognizes and
accepts this rule but refuses to close the class at the testator's death,
holding that a clear intention is shown by the words of the testator to
include any and all class members born after his death. The reasons
behind this rule of convenience are suggested by its name. If the class
is allowed to remain open until all possibility of increase is gone the
members of the class in esse or en ventre sa mere at the testator's death,
in most cases, would attain only limited and restricted benefits from the
gift for a considerable period of time. By application of the rule, how-
ever, the present members may utilize and enjoy the gift immediately
without restriction and without having to put up costly bonds to in-
demnify later born members; the quick settlement of the estate in the
interest of public policy is facilitated; and the property is more freely
alienable without possibility of cloud or defect in title. Even where the
rule is inapplicable North Carolina has now by statute7 provided for
the sale, lease, or mortgage of land where there are unborn interests.
The unborn interests are represented by guardians ad litem, and the
proceeds of the sale, lease, or mortgage are held in trust until the class
is closed and then distributed to the class. While this makes the land
more freely alienable the other objections to holding the class open are
still present in that the devisee's enjoyment of his gift is postponed, and
the estate is not brought to an early settlement.
A limitation to the applicability of the rule is the legal principle
frequently stated by the courts: that where the intent of the testator is
clearly shown such intent must govern the construction of the will.8
It is due to this desire of giving great weight to the testator's intention
that the present case and the majority hold the rule of convenience to
be nothing more than a rebuttable presumption,9 while others indicate
that it is an inexorable rule of law10 and apply the rule regardless of
any intention shown. In those jurisdictions holding the rule to be a
rebuttable presumption the determination of when an intent of the testa-
tor is shown so as to permit the courts to disregard the rule has been
Shinn v. Motley, 56 N. C. 490 (1857) ; Merrill v. Winchester, 120 Me. 203,
113 At!. 261 (1921) ; Hepburn v. Winthrop, 83 F. 2d 566 (D. C. Cir. 1936) ; 2
SimEs, FUTun INTr.ESTS §374 (1936).
'Long, Class Gifts in North Carolina, 22 N. C. L. Rar. 297, 314 (1944).
6 The rule in Kentucky is different in that if the class members are children
of a near relative of the testator the class remains open until all possibility of
increase is extinct. Patterson's Executor v. Dean, 241 Ky. 671, 44 S. W. 2d 565
(1931).7 N. C. SEss. L. 1949, c. 811. Discussed in 27 N. C. L. Rav. 415 (1949).
8'Rigsbee v. Rigsbee, 215 N. C. 757, 3 S. E. 2d 331 (1939).
'Cole v. Cole, 229 N. C. 757, 51 S. E. 2d 491 (1948) ; Sawyer v. Toxey, 194
N. C. 341, 139 S. E. 692 (1927) ; Shinn v. Motley, 56 N. C. 490 (1857).
'0 Mason v. White, 53 N. C. 421 (1862); Ringrose v. Brambam, 2 Cox 384,
30 Eng. Rep. 177 (1794).
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a subject of much controversy both in the United States and England
due to the subjectiveness of the question.
In the early case of Petaway v. Powell"- the North Carolina court,
by dictum, in a holding which excluded the members of a class born
after the testator's death, said that in accordance with the rule of con-
venience, if a legacy were given to the children of the testator's daugh-
ter "begotten or to be begotten" any children born after the testator's
death would be excluded.
But in the later case of Shinn v. Motley12 the North Carolina court
held that the words "to all their children which now are or hereafter
may be" show a clear intent of the testator to include all those children
born before or after his death so the rule was not applied. The court
cited as a precedent the North Carolina case of Shull v. Johnson13 but
there the words "to my nieces and nephews that might be living at or
after my death," as used in the will, without doubt showed the testa-
tor's intent to include those nieces and nephews born after his death.
It might be argued that the words "or hereafter may be" were intended
by the testator to mean those children born between the making of the
will and his death' 4 and thus the rule would apply to close the class at
his death since the intention of the testator to take the case out of the
rule must be clearly expressed. 15 In two cases 16 decided soon after the
Shinn case the court, relying on the Shinn case, held that the word
"hereafter" was intended by the testator to include all members of the
class born before or after his death although the gift in each case was
immediate. These cases seem to indicate that the court was departing
from the construction as stated in Petaway v. Powell' 7 although the
court did not overrule, distinguish, or even cite the Petaway case. How-
ever, in the later case of Sawyer v. Toxey' 8 the court, when confronted
-"22 N. C. 308 (1839) (there the words in the will were: "to A and his chil-
dren").
1256 N. C. 490 (1857).
1355 N. C. 202 (1855) ; The court also cited: Scott v. Earl of Scarborough,
1 Beav. 154, 48 Eng. Rep. 898 (1838) (trust with the proceeds for all and every
the child and children of testator's children "now born or who shall hereafter be
born during the lifetime of their respective parents." Held: this included all class
members born as long as there was possibility of increase. This expressly includes
all such members.).
"4 Butler v. Lowe, 10 Sim. 317, 59 Eng. Rep. 636 (1839) ("begotten or to be
begotten." The court held the words "to be begotten" to mean any members born
between the date of execution of the will and the death of the testator.).
1 Shinn v. Motley, supra.
'
0 Pickett v. Southerland, 60 N. C. 615 (1864) ("- to the rest of my nieces
that Mary now has or may hereafter have!'); Roper v. Roper, 58 N. C. 16 (1859)("A's children that she has now or may hereafter have").
' 22 N. C. 308 (1839).
'8 194 N. C. 341, 139 S. E. 692 (1927) (the court found an intent of the testa-
tor to close the class at his death in another clause of the will also but said that
the words describing the class are alone sufficient to close the class at his death
since no intent to keep it open longer is shown by the words.) ; in the case of
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with a will by which the testator left property to the children of two
daughters and four sons "or any other of my children who may have
children borned to them after the date of this will," held that only those
grandchildren in esse at the testator's death were entitled to share in
the property. The court there recognized the principle that if the testa-
tor's intent were clearly expressed to include later born members of the
class the rule would not operate to exclude them, but considered that
this was not such a case.
The cases from other jurisdictions are as controversial on this sub-
ject as are those from North Carolina. The Maine court in Merrill v.
Winchester,10 though recognizing the rule of convenience as merely a
rebuttable presumption, refused to take the case out of the general rule
where the will provided: '- and to her children, grandchildren, and,
great-grandchildren now living or hereafter born, I give and bequeath
the sum of three thousand dollars each, to be paid within two years
after this will is admitted to probate to those then living; and to those
born afterward, within two years from the date of birth." The court
held that "to those born afterwards" referred to any children en ventre
sa mere at the testator's death, and not to any conceived after his death.
There it was said that the language must be clear and unambiguous to
take the will out of the general rule, since without such a clear expression
it was improbable that the testator should wish to postpone the distribu-
tion of his estate so long. Other expressions as: "to all my first cous-
ins,"'20 "my nieces and nephews by blood or marriage,"2 1 "to A and his
family," 22 have been held not to show an intent of the testator to permit
the class to increase beyond his death. And yet in a West Virginia
case23 where the words "to E and her child or children" were used in
a will the court held that the words "or children" included any who
should be born after the testator's death.2 4
In England such words as: "to his children begotten or to be be-
Wise y. Leonhardt, 128 N. C. 289, 38 S. E. 892 (1901), where the words "to my
son Lawrences children-to be equally divided among them after the death of
my son Lawrence" were used, the court held that only those children of Lawrence
in being at the testator's death could take, the reason being that the title to the
land would be in vibubus until the class closed if left open for later born members,
This reason does not seem to be a proper one since the title might vest in those
in being subject to open up and let in after born members.1 120 Me. 203, 113 Atl. 261 (1921).
"Howland v. Slade, 155 Mass. 415, 29 N. E. 631 (1892).
"in re Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 131 Atl. 188 (1925).
22Langmaid v. Hurd, 64 N. H. 526, 15 Atl. 136 (1888).
22 Bently v. Ash, 59 W. Va. 641, 53 S. E. 636 (1906).
2Accord: Dean v. Long, 122 Ill. 447, 14 N. E. 34 (1887) (proceeds of trust
to E and her children) ; Kilgore v. Kilgore, 127 Ind. 276, 26 N. E. 56 (1890) (now
born or which may hereafter be born) ; Downes v. Long, 79 Md. 382, 29 Atl. 827(1894) (to wife and children of my son now living and to any other legitimate
child or children which may hereafter be born to him.
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gotten," 25 "to every child he hath,"2 6 "to each child that may be born to
either of the children of either of my brothers lawfully begotten,"27 "to
each of the children of nephews and nieces begotten or to be begotten ' 28
have been held to exclude any class members not in esse or en ventre
sa nwre. But, on the other hand, "whether now born or hereafter to be
born" 29 has been held to include all those children born after the testa-
tor's death.
The rule of convenience applies to deeds as well as to wills. So the
words "to A and his children" in a deed will convey the land jointly to
A and any children in esse or en ventre sa mere at the execution of the
deed to the exclusion of any other children born after the execution."
But if there is an intent clearly shown in the deed to include children.
born after the execution they will be included.8 1 Some courts have
said that in the case of a deed all the grantees must be in esse at the
date of execution.8 2 This does not seem to be a proper reason for the
exclusion of after born members since the title by deed may vest in
those in being subject to open up and let in later born members by
shifting use.88
It appears that some courts are more hesitant to include class mem-
bers born after the testator's death where there is a specified amount
left to each member than where there is a total sum left to the class as
a whole, since in the former situation the entire estate frequently must
be left open until the amount due the class is determined by the dosing
of the class, while in the latter situation only that share of the estate
left to the class must remain open until the possibility of increase is
extinct.8 4 Another distinction, that between real and personal property,
is made by some courts when confronted by a gift to a class. These
courts more readily hold the class open after the testator's death where
the gift is of realty on the ground that realty is more easily administered
while being held in abeyance awaiting the close of the class than is per-
" Sprackling v. Rainier, 1 Dick. Rep. 344, 21 Eng. Rep. 302 (1761) This
case was cited as a precedent in the North Carolina case of Petaway v. Powell,
.supra.
Ringrose v. Bramham, 2 Cox 384, 30 Eng. Rep. 177 (1794).
:' Storrs v. Benbow, 2 My. & K. 46, 39 Eng. Rep. 862 (1833).
2" Butler v. Lowe, 10 Sim. 317, 59 Eng. Rep. 636 (1839).
"Defflis v. Goldschmidt, 1 Mer. 417, 35 Eng. Rep. 727 (1816). This case
was decided after the Sprackling case, supra, note 24, but did not overrule, dis-
tinguish, or even cite the Sprackling case. It was, however, cited as a precedent
in the North Carolina case of Shinn v. Motley, supra.
'
0 Heath v. Heath, 114 N. C. 547, 19 S. E. 155 (1894) ; Cullens v. Cullens, 161
N. C. 344, 77 S. E. 228 (1913) (land goes to A and his children i esse or en
ventre sa mere at the date of the deed as tenants in common.).
1 Mellichamp v. Mellichamp, 28 S. C. 125, 5 S. E. 333 (1888) (to W. and the
children she already has and such children as she may hereafter bear.).
"2 Miller v. McAlister, 197 Ill. 72, 64 N. E. 254 (1902) (to M and her children,
born and to be born).
33 KALES, ESTATES, FuTURE INTERESTS, §74 (2d Ed. 1920).
" Mann v. Thompson, 69 Eng. Rep. 271 (1854).
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sonalty.8 5 These, however, do not seem to be proper distinctions since
the test of inconvenience to the entire estate as compared with the in-
convenience to the members of the class then in esse, and the test of
ease of administration of realty as against personalty do not change the
expression of the testator's intention, if any, as set out in the will.
The desirability of the principle of seeking the testator's intention
and attempting to follow it in the construction of a will is recognized,
yet, in seeking the intention of the testator, it should be remembered
that there are two probable intentions: one to admit as many members
as possible into the class, the other to give the members the benefit of
the gift immediately upon the testator's death and not force them to
wait for unknown periods to enjoy their property.80 Thus when the
courts apply the rule of convenience they are upholding one probable
intention while destroying the other probable intention of the testator.
Further, the courts and legislatures have not hesitated to defeat the
testator's expressed intention when applying the Rule in Shelley's
Case,37 and by converting fees tail into fees simnpleUS in order to facili-
tate administration and to further the enjoyment and convenience of the
recipients of devises and grants. Why then should the courts hesitate
because of ambiguous and doubtful language in a will to exclude class
members born after the testator's death? It is submitted that unless
the testator expressly provides for any member of a class born after
his death the court should avoid inconvenience and confusion and refuse
to admit such members.
As Justice Browning of the Virginia court said :88
"The written expression of human language has never reached
such a state of precision and exactness as to preclude one of men-
tal capacity and ingenuity from saying that one thing is meant,
and another of equal versatility saying that something else is in-
tended. Quite frequently confusion ensues from which comes the
troublesome element which we call 'doubt' and at that juncture
the law, ever wholesome and remedial, provides the way out by
supplying its rule of construction."
VICTOR S. BRYANT, JR.
"Cole v. Cole, 229 N. C. 757, 51 S. E. 2d 491 (1948).
LoNG, supra note 5, at 314.
ST Nichpls v. Gladden, 117 N. C. 497, 22 S. E. 459 (1895) (the court there
said the Rule in Shelley's Case is an inexorable rule of law and the intention of the
grantor or testator will not be considered).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-1 (1943).
" American National Bank and Trust Co. of Danville v. Herndon, 181 Va.
17, 19, 23 S. E. 2d 768, 770 (1943).
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Labor Law-U.S. Arbitration Act-Enforceability Thereunder of
Agreements to Arbitrate Labor Disputes
At common law, agreements to arbitrate existing or future disputes
are revocable by either party at any time before an award is made, and
courts will not, in the absence of statutory authority, grant specific
performance of such an agreement, or allow it to be pleaded as a bar to
an action." In order to abrogate this common law rule, fifteen states2
and the United States3 have enacted statutes which make written agree-
ments to arbitrate existing or future disputes irrevocable and enforce-
able. Four other states4 have passed the uniform arbitration act which
is applicable to existing disputes only, and does not provide for direct
enforcement.
The United States Act is based on the draft state arbitration act
approved by the American Arbitration Association and presented to
Congress by the American Bar Association. Section 2 of the act pro-
vides that written agreements to arbitrate existing or future disputes
arising out of maritime transactions or transactions involving interstate
or foreign commerce shall be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." Sec-
tion 3 provides for a stay of proceedings where suit is brought on any
issue referable to arbitration, and Section 4 provides for direct com-
pulsion of arbitration. 5 The remaining sections provide for appoint-
ment of arbitrators by the court, entering an award as a judgment of
court, vacating or modifying the award, and confirming it by order of
the court,
1 Executory arbitration agreements, while not illegal or void, would oust the
courts of jurisdiction and were therefore held to be against public policy. Specific
performance would not be granted since either party could revoke and make the
court order useless. Hamilton v. Home Insurance Co., 137 U.S. 370 (1890);
Home Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445 (U.S. 1874); Tobey v. County of
Bristol, 3 Story 800, Fed. Case No. 14,065 (1845) ; Rueda v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
180 Ore. 133, 175 P. 2d 778 (1946) ; RSSTATEMENT, CoNRAcrs §550 (1932). See
generally, Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83
U. oF PA. L. R~v. 132 (1934); Simpson, Specific Performance of Arbitration
Contracts, 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 160 (1934).
2Arizona, California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
'United States Arbitration Act, 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. A. §§1-14
(Supp. 1948).
'Nevada, North Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming. For an analysis of the uniform
act see Sturges, Arbitration Under the North Carolina Statute-The Uniform
Arbitration Act, 6 N. C. L. REv. 363 (1928).
1 Section 2, making certain written agreements to arbitrate valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable is, of necessity, limited to maritime and interstate commerce trans-
actions, since Congress has no power to legislate with respect to the validity
of contracts generally. But sections 3 and 4 are broad and not limited to maritime
and interstate commerce transactions, since they deal with procedure in the federal
courts, over which Congressional power is complete and not limited. Agostini
Bros. Building Corp. v. U.S., 142 F. 2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944); Donahue v. Susque-
hanna Collieries Co., 138 F. 2d 3 (3rd Cir. 1943).
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The act has been successful in changing the common law rfile as to
written agreements to arbitrate in commercial and maritime contracts,
and under it the federal courts now specifically enforce agreements to
arbitrate and allow stay of suit until arbitration is had However,
section 1 of the act, after defining "maritime transactions" and "com-
merce," adds a clause, ". . . but nothing herein contained shall apply
to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." This
clause has led to a conflict between the circuit courts of appeals, as to
whether or not any part of the'act applies to arbitration clauses in col-
lective bargaining agreements. 7
Three decisions of the third circuits have applied section 3 of the
act and allowed stay of action, even though the arbitration clause in-
volved was contained in a collective bargaining agreement. In Watkins
v. Hudson Coal Co.9 that court held that the exclusion of contracts of
employment in section 1 of the act did not apply to section 3, and al-
lowed a stay of suit until arbitration was had.10 The court reasoned,
Judge Goodrich writing the opinion, that the clause excluding employ-
ment contracts in section 1 is applicable only to the definitions of "mari-
time transactions" and "commerce" contained therein, and since these
terms appear again only in section 2, section 3 and the remainder of the
act are not limited by the clause."
'Agostini Bros. Building Corp. v. U.S., 142 F. 2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944); Kulu-
kundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942).
The great majority of collective bargaining agreements now contain a clause
providing for arbitration of any disputes arising from interpretation of the con-
tract, which have not been settled through a specified grievance procedure. Of
the fifteen states which have statutes similar to the United States act, six, Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York, have
made their statutes applicable to labor contracts either by specific provision or
court interpretation. Comment, Arbitration of Labor Contract Disputes, 43 ILL. L.
Rv. 678 (1948).
' Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F. 2d 970 (3rd Cir. 1947) (followed the
Donahue case without any mention of the exclusion clause) ; Watkins v. Hudson
Coal Co., 151 F. 2d 311 (3rd Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 777 (1946);
Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F. 2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943) (the court
made no mention of the exclusion clause in section 1, but did apply section 3 to a
collective bargaining agreement).
'151 F. 2d 311 (3rd Cir. 1945).
"0 One judge dissented and followed the view of the fourth and sixth circuits
that the exclusion in section 1 should apply to the entire act.
" The argument has also been advanced that collective bargaining agreements
should not be excluded from the act since such an agreement should not be con-
sidered a "contract of employment" within the sense of the exception. Freiden,
Legal Status of Labor Arbitration, NEw YoRK UNivERsITY FIRST ANNUAL CON-
FEREN oN LABOR (1948) 233, 247. In Levy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 692,
104 P. 2d 770 (1940), the court reached a somewhat similar result when it held
that an exclusion of "contracts pertaining to labor" from the California Arbitration
Act did not exclude collective bargaining agreements. A comment in 29 CALIF.
L. R v. 411 (1941) indicates this case was decided on the grounds that public
policy favors the settlement of labor disputes by arbitration.
Also, by bringing an action under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act there
[Vol. 2
1950] NOTES AND COMMENTS 227
One case in the sixth circuit1 2 and one in the fourth circuit'3 have
reached results contra to the third circuit opinions, holding that the
exclusion clause in section 1 applies to the whole act. The more ac-
curate interpretation of the exclusion clause appears to be that followed
by Judge Parker of the fourth circuit in International Union United
Furniture Workers of America v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co.,
Inc.14 Section 1, which contains the words of exclusion, is introductory
only, and contains no substantive provisions of the act. Being placed
in such an introductory section, the words "nothing herein contained"
seem clearly to indicate that the exclusion was intended to apply to all
the substantive provisions of the act, and not just to one particular
section. To say, as the third circuit decisions do, that the exclusion
applies only to the definition of "commerce" in section 1, and therefore
only to section 2 of the substantive portions of the act, would result in
the exclusion clause being completely meaningless. 15 By this reasoning
contracts of employment would be excluded from the class of contracts
made valid, irrevocable, and enforceable in section 2, but would still be
indirectly enforceable by stay of action under section 3, and directly
enforceable by court order under section 4.
Since there was no consideration of the exclusion clause in the
passage of the act through Congress, and no indication as to whether
or not Congress intended the act to apply to collective bargaining agree-
ments,16 none of the decisions could rely on legislative history as evi-
lence of Congressional intention.17 However, the history of the prepa-
ration and submission of the act to Congress by the American Bar
Association indicates that, while originally intended to apply to all types
of arbitration agreements, it was later amended to exclude collective
may be enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate without resort to the arbitration
act. In Northland Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 66 F. Supp. 431 (D.
Minn. 1937) an action was brought by the company for a declaration of rights
under a collective bargaining agreement. The declaratory judgment held that the
dispute was subject to arbitration under the contract. See also Oil Workers
International Union v. Taxoma Natural Gas Co., 146 F. 2d 62 (5th Cir. 1944).
" Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. 2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944) (defendant's motion
to stay the proceedings was overruled since the agreement to arbitrate was in a
labor contract).
" International Union United Furniture Workers of America v. Colonial Hard-
wood Flooring Co., Inc., 168 F. 2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948) (refused to allow a stay of
proceedings under section 3 of the act).
,Ibid.
15 "Unless the excepting language applies to the entire statute, it seems to me
rather meaningless." Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F. 2d 311, 321 (3rd Cir.
1945), dissenting opinion by Judge McAllister.
" In discussions of the bill the committee reports consistently referred to it as
a "commercial arbitration act," and there was no consideration of the meaning of
the exclusion clause.
"7 The only reference to the intention of Congress was made in the Colonial
Hardwood Flooring Co. case, in which Judge Parker said, "It is perfectly clear,
we think, that it was the intention of Congress to exclude contracts of employment
from the operation of all these provisions."
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bargaining contracts from its operation. As first prepared by the Asso-
ciation's Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law in 1921,
the bill did not contain the exclusion.' 8  In 1923, to eliminate opposi-
tion by a leader of the Seamen's Union, 10 and because of fear that addi-
tional labor opposition might threaten passage of the act through Con-
gress, 20 the exclusion clause was added to the end of section 1.
While agreeing that the better reasoned interpretation of the act is
that, in its present form, it does not make an arbitration clause in a col-
lective bargaining agreement specifically enforceable, it is submitted that
public policy and common sense demand that such agreements should
be enforced. 21 Arbitration has become a recognized and effective
method for the settlement of industrial disputes, and refusal by courts
to enforce an arbitration agreement might cause resort to unnecessary
litigation or the use of force in the settlement of disputes, which is the
very thing the agreement was intended to prevent.2 2 Enforcement
would not amount to compulsory arbitration. There would be no com-
pulsion by the courts until the parties had voluntarily agreed in writing
that they would arbitrate.23 In reality, most arbitration clauses in labor
contracts are now carried out by both parties without any need for
court action. But in situations where one party may now refuse to
arbitrate, the knowledge that courts will enforce the agreement would
greatly reduce the number of these refusals. In the federal field, an
8 XLVI A. B. A. REP. 359 (1921).
' XLVIII A. B. A. REP. 287 (1923).
20 "The proviso in it which excepts from its operation workers' agreements,
while regarded by its framers as no improvement, was suggested by Herbert
Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, a staunch friend of the measure, as a wise sop
to the Cerberus of Labor." Gordon, International Aspects of Trade Arbitration,
11 A. B. A. J. 717 (1925). Labor opposition was based on a feeling that specific
performance of arbitration agreements in labor contracts resembled compulsory
arbitration, and a fear that it might lead to forced arbitration of disputes over
new contract terms.
21 "In the field of industry, a chorus of deserved derision would silence declara-
tion that a collective bargaining agreement for arbitration of future issues was
violation of public policy. If there ever was public policy against agreements to
arbitrate, it has disappeared." Park Construction Co. v. Independent School Dis-
trict, 209 Minn. 182, 186, 296 N.W. 475, 477 (1941). See also Simpson, Specific
Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 160 (1934) ; Fraenkel,
The Legal E&forceability of Agreements to Arbitrate Labor Disputes, 1 ARn. J.
360 (1937).
2 This public policy view appears to be the real reason that the third circuit
has applied the act to collective bargaining agreements. In Evans v. Hudson Coal
Co., 165 F. 2d 970, 974 (3rd Cir. 1947) the court said, "Time, energy, and money
have been expended by both Mine Workers and Operators in litigation in the
courts of this Circuit. We are of the opinion that these expenditures have been
unrewarding. Mine Workers and Operators have made a series of valid and
binding agreements for arbitration. They must submit to the arbitration upon
which they have agreed."
2 The parties could specify in the arbitration agreement exactly what type of
dispute they will arbitrate, and any court order of enforcement or stay of action
would be limited to those disputes only. This would eliminate any danger of
forced arbitration of disputes over new contract terms.
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amendment to the United States Arbitration Act extending it to embrace
written agreements to arbitrate labor disputes would lead to settlement
of even more industrial disputes by peaceful arbitration.24
LEROY F. FULLER.
Real Property-Deeds-Requisites to a Valid
Delivery in North Carolina
In the recent North Carolina case of Ballard v. Ballrd,' a grantor
drafted, signed, sealed, and registered an instrument which purported
to convey for a consideration a tract of land to the grantee (son of the
grantor), subject to a twenty-one year estate reserved by the grantor.
After the grantor's death, the widow, who hafd married the grantor
after the conveyance, filed a petition for dower claiming that the deed
was not delivered, and the Superior Court granted this petition, but the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held that registration in
addition to a declaration by the grantor that he had conveyed to the
grantee was sufficient evidence of an effective delivery even though it
was not shown that the deed was ever physically transferred to the
grantee and though the grantor apparently retained possession of the
deed until his death. Although the holding of the instant case does not,
in itself, change the law on the subject of delivery, there were state-
ments in the opinion indicating, perhaps, a relaxation of the former
requirements stated by the court in Gillespie v. Gillespie, where it said:
"Whether a deed has been delivered in the legal sense is not dependent
exclusively upon the question of its manual or physical transfer from the
grantor to the grantee but also upon the intent of the parties. Both the
delivery of the instrunent and the intention to deliver it are necessary
to a transmutation of title."2
It is the purpose of this note to examine, in the light of past cases,
the three requirements of a valid delivery as enunciated by the court in
24 Such an amendment has been suggested for presentation to Congress. Sturges,
Proposed Amendment of the United States Arbitrationt Act, 6 ARm. J. 227 (1942).
It has been suggested that the same result could be reached by a court simply lim-
iting the common law rule of revocability to commercial disputes and, on the basis
of public policy, refusing to extend the rule into the field of labor disputes. Latter
v. Holsum Bread Co., 108 Utah 364, 160 P. 2d 421 (1945) ; Comment, Arbitration
of Labor Contract Disputes, 43 ILL. L. REv. 678 (1948). There is very little pos-
sibility of the federal courts reaching this result, however, because of the existing
line of cases which have refused to make this distinction.
'Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 55 S. E. 2d 316 (1949). The court, how-
ever, held that the admission of incompetent testimony by the widow as to non-
delivery of the deed under which the grantee claimed title was prejudicial error and
set aside the verdict and judgment since the witness did not show that she had
had an opportunity to acquire personal knowledge of the facts of delivery.
2 Gillespie v. Gillespie, 187 N. C. 40, 41, 120 S. E. 822, 823 (1924). Italics
added.
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the present case and to determine how these requirements might affect
the old law. In the instant case the court said:
"The requisites to the valid delivery of a deed are threefold.
They are: (1) An intention on the part of the grantor to give the
instrument legal effect according to its purport and tenor; (2)
the evidencing of such intention by some word or act disclosing
that the grantor has put the instrument beyond his legal control,
though not necessarily beyond his physical control; and (3) ac-
quiescence by the grantee in such intention.""
First, there must be an intent on the part of the grantor to give the
instrument legal effect. The intention of the parties at the time is con-
trolling as to whether there has been an effective delivery ;4 but intention
by the grantor has not in the past taken the place of a manual transfer5
nor is mere physical transfer without intent a valid delivery.0 A handing
over of the instrument to a third party for examination does not consti-
tute an effective delivery, since the requisite intent for a valid delivery
is lacking. 7
Second, in order to constitute a valid delivery, there must be "the
evidencing of such intention by some word or act disclosing that the
grantor has put the instrument beyond his legal control, though not
'Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949). Italics
added.
'Blades v. Wilmington Trust Co., 207 N. C. 771, 178 S. E. 565 (1935). In
Lee v. Parker, 171 N. C. 144, 88 S. E. 217 (1916), the grantor was confined to
her bed and there was evidence tending to show that she was averse to executing
the deed, but was afraid to refuse to do so. It was held that the jury should
consider the question of whether the grantor had exercised her will and executed
the instrument with the intent that it should operate as her deed. In Gaylord v.
Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222, 233, 63 S. E. 1028, 1033 (1909), a grantor had prepared,
signed, and sealed an instrument and had given it to his brother for the purpose
of keeping the instrument until he should get his family affairs corrected. It was
held that manual delivery alone is not enough but that there must also be an intent
to deliver, the court saying: "And the authorities are uniformly to the effect that,
in order to be a valid delivery, the deed must pass from the possession and control
of the grantor to that of the grantee, or to someone for the grantee's use and
benefit, with the intent at the time that title should pass or the instrument become
effective as a conveyance."
'In Fortune v. Hunt, 149 N. C. 358, 360, 63 S. E. 82, 83 (1908), where the
grantor had given a deed to a third persons with instructions to have it delivered
in case of the grantor's death, but to retain it subject to the grantor's control until
the grantor's death, it was held that there was no delivery, the court saying: "The
intention of the grantor will not take the place of actual delivery, which is essential
to the validity of a deed."
o "There must not only be a physical delivery of a deed as the final act of
execution, but it must be accompanied by an intent of the grantor to perfect the
instrument." See Huddleston v. Hardy, 164 N. C. 210, 214, 80 S. E. 158, 160
(1913), (concurring opinion).
'Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222, 63 S. E. 1028 (1909); in Tarlton v.
Griggs, 131 N. C. 216, 221, 42 S. E. 591, 593 (1902), a deed by the grantor was
given to a third person to hold until certain other deeds should be executed by the
grantor; the grantees took possession of the deeds, and the court in holding no
delivery said: "There must be an intention of the grantor to pass the deed from
his possession and beyond his control. . . . Both the intent and the act are
necessary to the valid delivery."
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necessarily beyond his physical control. '3 These words taken in their
context might appear to mean that intention alone, evidenced by some
word or act, is sufficient for a valid delivery. If so, the court has re-
laxed the requirement of a manual transfer of the instrument in addi-
tion to intention to make the deed effective. However, some of the
cases cited in support of the court's statement seem to hold that both
the intent and the ceremonial passing on of the deed itself are essential
to its validity.9 Also, there is a statement in the case which reads:
"But manual possession of the instrument is not essential to delivery.
It is sufficient if the grantor delivers the writing to some third person
for the grantee's benefit." 10 The first sentence taken alone would seem
to bear out the suggested interpretation, but a perusal of the cases cited
demonstrates that the first sentence cannot be supported, by itself, but
must be read in conjunction with the latter sentence.
The expression "delivery," as applied to written instruments, had
its beginning in connection with written conveyances of land, and the
manual transfer of the instrument in early times was regarded as the
symbolical transfer of the land itself, analogous to livery of seisin. The
notion of physically giving the instrument to the grantee applied also
in connection with written contracts, the manual transfer of the docu-
ment being necessary to make it legally operative and effective. While
delivery is still required in connection with negotiable and other instru-
ments of an analogous character, the old conception of a manual transfer
of the instrument as the only means of making it legally operative has
been superseded in most instances by the modem view that delivery is
merely a question of intention supplemented by some manifestation of
that intention."
In North Carolina, however, insofar as deeds are concerned, the
court has in the past spoken as though a physical changing of possession
of the 'deed were indispensable to an effectual delivery. In some North
Carolina cases, holding that there was no delivery, the want of a physi-
cal transfer of the deed seems unduly emphasized in the face of quite
convincing evidence of the intention of both the grantor and the grantee
that the deed should become effective. In a recent case,12 omitted from
the cases cited by the court in the case at bar, a grantor placed the deed
in his Bible on the dresser in his bedroom. He told his daughter, one
of the witnesses, where he was putting the deed and instructed her to
8 Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949). Italics
added.
'Gillespie v. Gillespie, 187 N. C. 40, 120 S. E. 822 (1924) ; Lee v. Parker, 171
N. C. 144, 88 S. E. 217 (1916).
Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949).
Tiffany, Real Property, §1033 (3rd ed. 1939).
'= Barnes v. Aycock, 219 N. C. 360, 362, 13 S. E. 2d 611, 612 (1941). Compare
Tarlton v. Griggs, 131 N. C. 216, 221, 42 S. E. 591, 593 (1902).
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tell the grantee where it was and to have it recorded, but this message
was not delivered. The deed remained in the Bible and never came
into the possession of the grantee or anyone for her. It was held that
there was no delivery in spite of the fact that the grantor had expressed
an intention of giving the land to the grantee and the grantee had had
control of the land until the grantor's death. The court said: "To con-
stitute delivery the papers must be put out of the possession of the
maker."
In another North Carolina case, 18 deeds were placed in a lock box
in a bank with the intention that they should convey to the grantor's
children certain land which the grantor owned. The deeds were found
after the grantor's death with the names of each of the grantees on
them, and although the grantor devised all his land except that which
he had purported and intended to convey by the deeds, it was held that
there was no delivery since the grantor did not relinquish control of the
instruments. In a Pennsylvania case,1 4 the grantor put a deed in a
safe among his other papers with the intention that the same should
be a delivery and later made oral declarations of that intention. It was
there held that there was a valid delivery of the deed. A distinguishing
feature was the fact that in the latter case, the grantee had access to the
safe, but the court indicated that that consideration was not controlling.
In the instant case it was pointed out that there is a presumption of
delivery of a deed arising from its registration, 15 but such presumption
is subject to rebuttal. 16 It has been held that where a deed is delivered
by the grantor to a- Register of Deeds, or even to his deputy clerk, to
have it registered with the intent that title should pass, there is a suffi-
cient delivery even though the deed is not registered ;17 but where a
deed is registered for fear that it might be destroyed, and not with the
intention that it should then become a deed, such evidence is sufficient
to rebut the presumption of delivery arising out of registration.' 8 As
was held in the present case, however, mere possession of the deed by
the grantor after it has been recorded is not entitled to much considera-
tion in rebutting the presumption of delivery, especially in view of the
fact that the grantor reserved an estate for a term of years.1 9
13 Thomas v. Conyers, 198 N. C. 229, 151 S. E. 270 (1930).
14 Kanawell v. Miller, 262 Pa. 9, 104 Atl. 861 (1918)
Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949).
"Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Griffin, 207 N. C. 265, 176 S. E. 555
(1934).
"1In Robbins v. Rascoe, 120 N. C. 80, 26 S. E. 807 (1897), where an instru-
ment was delivered by the grantor to a deputy clerk with instructions to have it
registered before the clerk, who was then absent, the court held the delivery was
complete and valid, and the grantor could not afterwards take the deed back
from the deputy clerk even though the grantee did not at that time know of the
conveyance and the clerk had not then registered the deed.
" Ellington v. Currie, 40 N. C. 21 (1847).
19 Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949). See
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It was pointed out in the case at bar that delivery made to a third
person is effectual to transfer title,20 and this is so even if the third
person is a stranger.21 When the maker delivers a deed to a third
person for the grantee, parting with the possession of it without any
condition as to how the third party shall hold it, the delivery is com-
plete and title passes at once, though the grantee be ignorant of the
facts, and neither the grantor nor anyone else can later defeat such a
delivery. 22
The present case indicates that mere possession by the grantor of
the deed is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of a valid delivery
arising from the registration of the deed by the grantor. 23 Further, it
has been held that a deed delivered to a grantee by a grantor, but after-
wards placed with a third party for safekeeping until they should both
call for it is a good delivery and not an escrow.24 Where a deed is
executed and witnessed, and left on a table with both the grantor and
grantee present, a presumption of delivery arises, 25 notwithstanding
cases that hold contra when only the grantor is present. 26
The third requisite of a valid lelivery as enunciated by the court in
the instant case is "acquiescence by the grantee in such intention," 27
i.e., by acceptance. Acceptance does not ordinarily constitute a prob-
lem in delivery, inasmuch as a grantee is presumed to accept provided
the conveyance is for the grantee's benefit. The presumption is not
that he will accept, but that he does accept,28 and such acceptance is
effectual until a contrary intent is shown.29
In spite of the statements and the cases cited in the instant case,
which apparently indicate a contrary view, it is to be hoped that the
second requirement promulgated by the court has changed North Caro-
also Faircloth v. Johnson, 189 N. C. 429, 127 S. E. 346 (1925) ; Phifer v. Mullis,
167 N. C. 405, 83 S. E. 582 (1914); Helms v. Austine, 116 N. C. 751, 21 S. E.
556 (1895).
"O Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949).
"Wesson v. Stephens, 37 N. C. 557 (1843).
"In Buchanan v. Clark, 164 N. C. 56, 80 S. E. 424 (1913), a father pur-
chased lands and had a conveyance made to his illegitimate son, without the son's
knowledge, and the son died before the instrument was sent to him, the convey-
ance was held to be good notwithstanding the father's attempt to obtain a second
conveyance from the original grantor himself. In Hall v. Harris, 40 N. C. 303
(1848), a paper was signed, sealed, and handed to a third person, to be delivered
to the grantee on a condition which the grantee afterwards complied with, the
delivery of the paper was held to be effective and complete and the deed took
effect at the time of the original transfer.
" Perkins v. Thompson, 123 N. C. 175, 31 S. E. 387 (1898); Williams v.
Springs, 29 N. C. 384 (1847).
2 Gibson v. Partee, 19 N. C. 530 (1837).
" Levister v. Hilliard, 57 N. C. 12 (1858).
"Baldwin v. Maultsby, 27 N. C. 505 (1845) ; Kirk v. Turner, 16 N. C. 14
(1826).
'* Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949).
"Henry v. Heggie, 163 N. C. 523, 79 S. E. 982 (1913).
"Smith v. Moore, 149 N. C. 185, 62 S. E. 892 (1908).
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lina's obsolete view of "delivery," that in addition to intention there
must be a manual transfer of the instrument itself. If such is not the
case, certainly there is the possibility that the court in future cases may
use this well-considered statement as a springboard toward the modern
and majority view that delivery is merely a question of intention to
give the deed legal effect evidenced by some word or act indicating
such an intention." °
GEORGE J. RABiL.
Taxation-Effect of Renunciation on the Taxability of
Property Subject to Power of Appointment
In order to minimize the estate tax on the passing of property many
a testator devises his property to his wife or child for life, giving the
devisee the power to appoint by will the ultimate taker of the property.
Usually he also provides that in the event of the failure of the donee of
the power of appointment to exercise this power, the property, at the
death of the donee, will go to a specified beneficiary. Whether or not
the property subject to the power is taxable in the donee's estate where
the appointee is also a taker in default has been the subject of much
litigation and of endless legal writings.'
Early in the line of cases, New York declared that where the ap-
pointee took a one-fourth interest in an estate under the exercise of a
power of appointment instead of the one-seventh interest which would
have been his had the power not been exercised, the entire amount was
taxable in the estate of the donee.2 Then, in 1905, where the appointee
had renounced all rights under the exercise of the power, the same court
declared that an interest given in default of appointment vested at the
death of the donor of the power, and that since the appointee would
take the same interest under the power as was already vested in her in
default, the interest was not taxable in the donee's estate.8 Much later
"Tiffany, Real Property, §1033 (3rd ed. 1939).
' 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §9.01 et seq. (1942); Eisen-
stein, Powers of Appointment and Estate Taxes: I, II, 52 YALE L. J. 296, 494
(1943) (contains a good collection of legal articles).
'In re Potter's Estate, 51 App. Div. 212, 64 N. Y. Supp. 1013 (1900); In re
Chauncey's Estate, 102 Misc. 378, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1019 (1918) (the appointee
filed a conditional election whereby she desired to take under the instrument which
gave her the larger amount) ; In re Taylor's Estate, 209 App. Div. 299, 204 N. Y.
Supp. 367 (1922) (the appointee could not claim part under the donor's will and
the excess under that of the donee) ; see It re Delano's Estate, 176 N. Y. 486,
68 N. E. 871 (1903). Contra: 3 RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY §369(c) (1940) ("if
the total property passing to such appointee differs from his interest in default of
appointment only in that it is a larger fractional interest in the ... thing covered
by the power, the property passes . . . in default of appointment so far as the
appointed interest is identical to the interest in default.").
'In re Lansing's Estate, 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905). But cf. In re
Cooksey's Estate, 182 N. Y. 92, 74 N. E. 880 (1905) where the court held the
interests taxable because the donor's will did not allow any default interest to
vest unless and until the donee died without exercising the power.
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the U. S. Supreme Court in Helvering v. Grinnell4 adopted the view of
the New York court and held that where the appointee renounced his
interest under the appointment and took the same interest under the
will of the donor, the property passing to him was not taxable in the
estate of the donee.0
Emphasis was placed on the "passing" requirement of the tax stat-
ute,6 the court finding that no property interest passed by virtue of the
admitted exercise of the general power of appointment.
Since the Grinnell decision, the major problem has been to determine
whether that decision was based primarily on the renunciation by the
appointees or on the fact that the interests in 'default and under the
power were exactly the same. Both views have received support.7
Where the appointee received the exact equivalent, or a lesser amount,
the majority of the cases, prior to 1943, favored non-taxability.8
Although now overruled by statute9 as to donees dying after Octo-
'294 U.S. 153 (1935).
'The same result was reached in In re Chauncey's Estate, supra note 2, where
the appointee took the exact amount under the will of the donor that he would
have under the will of the donee, he having previously filed an election to take
under whichever will left him the greater amount.
'Revenue Act of 1926, §302, 44 STAr. 9 (1926). The value of the gross estate
of a decedent shall include the value of property "(f) To the extent of any
property passing under a general power of appointment exercised by the dece-
dent. . . ." The three conditions precedent to taxation of the interests were:
"(1) The existence of a general power of appointment; (2) an exercise of that
power by the decedent by will; and (3) the passing of the property in virtue of
such exercise," Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U.S. 153, 155 (1935).
" Renunciation or election is immaterial, Lewis v. Rothensies, 138 F. 2d 129,
132 (3rd Cir. 1943); Rothensies v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 112 F. 2d
758 (3rd Cir. 1940) ; Morris v. Commissioner, 39 B. T. A. 570 (1939); James C.
Webster, 38 B. T. A. 273 (1938). Renunciation or election is inseparable from
the Grinnell case, Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410 (1943) ; Hel-
vering v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942) ; see Estate of Guggen-
heim, 1 T. C. 845, 852 (1943) ; Estate of Morris, 38 B. T. A. 408 (1938).8 Lewis v. Rothensies, supra note 7; Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F. 2d
760 (4th Cir. 1940) ; Rothensies v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., supra note 7;
In re Duryea's Estate, 277 N. Y. 310, 14 N. E. 2d 369 (1938) ; James C. Webster,
38 B. T. A. 273 (1938) ; Eisenstein, Powers of Appointment and Estate Taxes: I,
52 YALE L. J. 296, 327 (1943). But Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S.
410 (1943) held taxable interests which were appointed to the taker in default
in a lesser amount than would have passed in default, declaring that the estate
tax is aimed at the "exercise of the privilege of directing the course of property
after a man's death." This case controlled the decision in Estate of Kerr v. Com-
missioner, 9 T. C. 359 (1947) (the appointing will was the instrument through
which the beneficiary received his interest which was smaller than that given him
in default). Prior to Helvering v. Grinnell the theory of "confirmation of a
theretofore defeasible title" had allowed taxation. Lee v. Commissioner, 57 F. 2d
399 (D. C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied Lee v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 563 (1931) (the
appointee took a vested remainder instead of an absolute fee in default) ; Wear v.
Commissioner, 65 F. 2d 665 (3rd Cir. 1933) ("The generating source of the
change was the death of the donee without action adverse to them.").
' INT. REv. CODE §811. "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall
be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real
or personal .. . (f) To the extent of any property (A) with respect to which
the decedent has at the time of his death a power of appointment. . . ." or has
exercised or released a power in contemplation of death or by a disposition in-
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ber 21, 1942, the Grinnell rule still affects litigation over taxes on
estates of decedents dying before that date. Such was the situation in
Commissioner v. Cardezds Estate'o where A died leaving two-thirds
of his estate to his daughter for life, and giving her a general testamen-
tary power of appointment. He also provided that in default of ap-
pointment the income was to go to his grandchildren, living at her death,
for the life of C, a grandson living at the time of his death, and that the
principal was then to be divided among his grandchildren or their issue.
The daughter died in 1939 and appointed all the property subject to
the power to her son, C, in fee, who, fourteen months after her leath,
renounced all benefits under his mother's testamentary exercise of the
power, he being the sole surviving lineal descendant. Held: The prop-
erty is not taxable in the donee's estate.
The contentions of the commissioner in this case are worth noting,
the second being a novel attempt to open another avenue of attack on
powers exercised before 1942. The commissioner contended first, that
the Grinnell rule should be limited to the situation where the interests,
appointed and in default, were equal, but this was rejected. The entire
court declared it would be "purely fictional" to assert that the property
passed by virtue of the appointment as the appointee had rejected all
benefits under the power." He also argued that this was not the ordi-
nary default gift and that the word "executed," in the will of A, applied
only to those acts of the donee necessary to a valid execution in form
of the power; that the power was validly executed by the donee in that
she performed all acts contemplated by the donor, and even if the
property has not passed because of the renunciation, still the execution
itself cut off the gift in default of appointment, and the property passed
by intestacy. 12 Leaving this contention unanswered except as the final
decision affects it, the two majority judges, in ruling for the taxpayer,
based their decision on the theory that since no property passed by
virtue of the execution of the power, the default interests, which ac-
cording to Pennsylvania law vested at the death of the donor subject
tended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after his death. However, if the
power of appointment was created on or before October 21, 1942 and is released,
or the donee dies without exercising the power, before July 1, 1950, the value of
the property subject to the power is not includible in the donee's estate. If the
donee was under a legal disability on October 21, 1942 and it continues beyond
July 1, 1950, the later date will be extended to six months after the termination
of the legal disability. Revenue Act of 1942, §403, 56 STAr. 944 (1942), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 137, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (June 28, 1949).
10173 F. 2d 19 (3rd Cir. 1949).
"Id. at 24. But property has been declared to have passed under the power
even though there was a renunciation. In re King's Estate, 217 N. Y. 358, 111
N. E. 1060 (1916).
2 Commissioner v. Cardeza's Estate, 173 F. 2d 19, 24 (3rd Cir. 1949). The
argument for partial intestacy had been unsuccessfully advanced by the beneficiaries
in In re King's Estate, supra note 11.
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to be divested by the exercise of the power, were never divested, and
thus not taxable in the estate of the donee.
In reality, although the court contends that it is merely applying
Pennsylvania law, it is also determining the intention of the donor at
the time he used the word "executed," for it was necessary that this
intention be determined prior to the application of any local law. There
are three steps which the writer believes the court used in arriving at
its decision. It decided first, that "execute" means "exercise," second,
that "exercise" means "effective exercise to transfer to the appointee
the property," and third, that under the Pennsylvania law a gift in de-
fault of appointment vests immediately upon the death of the donor,
subject to be divested by the "exercise" of the power. Thus, the donor's
intention, according to the court, was to vest the gifts, subject to divest-
ment by the effective transfer of the property interest to the appointee,
which never happened.
North Carolina probably agrees with the divestment theory of Penn-
sylvania, having declared that where there is no gift in default, the
interest passes by act of law on the death of the donor to the distribu-
tees, subject to be divested by the exercise of the power.13 It is gen-
erally conceded that reference must be made to local law to find out
whether or not the decedent had an interest in the property.1 4 Where
the facts do not show dearly that the power was exercised, many states
supply the exercise by statute or by interpretation of the acts of the
donee. The court here expressly applied the Pennsylvania law. North
Carolina has by statute'15 and court decision' 6 declared that, unless a
"2 Holt v. Hogan, 58 N. C. 82 (1859). This theory of the interest vesting
subject to be divested by the exercise of the power is an old one, Cunningham v.
Moody, 1 Ves. Sr. 174, 27 Eng. Rep. 965 (1748) ; Doe v. Martin, 4 T. 1L 39, 65,
100 Eng. Rep. 882, 896 (1790) ; 2 SUGDEN, A PRAcTIcAL TREATISE OF POWERS 5,
33, 119 (1837), which is still accepted, Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F. 2d
760 (4th Cir. 1940) ; James C. Webster, 38 B. T. A. 273 (1938) ; In re Freeman's
Estate, 35 Pa. Super, 185, 189 (1908) approved in 280 Pa. 273, 124 Atl. 435(1924) and in 281 Pa. 190, 126 Atl. 270 (1924); FARWELL, A CoNcIsE TREATIsE
ox PowERs 310 (3rd ed. 1916) ; 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AmERIcAN LAW 369(10th ed. 1840) ; 3 WALsH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPRTY §323
(1947) ; see Estate of Day v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 524, 529 (1941).
"' Rothensies v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 112 F. 2d 758 (3rd Cir. 1940);
Morris v. Commissioner, 39 B. T. A. 570 (1939) ; Estate of F. R. Shepherd, 39
B. T. A. 38 (1939) ("The Board, like the Federal courts, is bound by decisions
of the state courts in xegard to property rights and the effect of conveyances exe-
cuted within the state relating to property situated therein.") ; James C. Webster,
38 B. T. A. 273 (1938) ; Cone v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 515 (1934) ; 1 PAUL,
FED. ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §9.14 (1942). Where the state court has
spoken, the application is simple. Where it has not, the federal court must apply
its own interpretation of the state law. 1 PAUL, supra at 441; Eisenstein, supra
note 8, at 304.
11 N. C. GEN. STAT., §31-43 (1943) ("A general devise of the real estate of
the testator . . . shall be construed to include any real estate ... which he may
have power to appoint. . . ." This section also applies to personalty.); N. C.
GEN. STAT., §105-2(5) (1943) (This provision taxes the exercise of powers of
appointment at the rates based on the relationship between the appointee and the
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contrary intent is shown in the will, a power of appointment will be
deemed exercised by a general bequest or devise or by a general re-
siduary clause.
The Cardeza decision still seems to be limited by Estate of Kerr v.
Commissioners'7 in which the Tax Court held the entire amount of the
interests taxable in the donee's estate even though the new interests,
remainders, were merely a smaller part of the default interests, estates
in fee. However, the court distinguished its decision in the Cardeza
case on the ground that there were in that case no new interests created
under the power, the appointee taking exactly what he had before the
attempted exercise of the power.
ROBERT L. HINES.
Taxation-Income-Fanily Partnerships
Great difficulty has been encountered in determining the status of
family partnerships as a means of effecting tax savings through a divi-
sion of income among the family members. Culbertson v. Commis-
sioner,1 although more favorable to the taxpayer than prior decisions
in the Tax Court, has admittedly produced greater subjectivity and con-
sequently increased uncertainty in an area already extensively litigated.
Although provision under the Revenue Act of 1948 for joint returns
of husband and wife virtually renders consideration of this type of
partnership unnecessary, the problem is still much alive in the formation
of parent-child arrangements.
An understanding of the well recognized principles governing tax
liability in these family arrangements is essential as a background to
Culbertson. Lucas v. Earl ruled that the tax burden may not be shifted
by an assignment of future income from services rendered by the assig-
nor; income is taxable to the tree which actually bore the fruit.2 As a
corollary, income from property may be taxable to the donor if he re-
donor; if the power is unexercised, the rates are based on the relationship between
the beneficiary and the donee.).
"Johnston v. Knight, 117 N. C. 122, 23 S. E. 92 (1895) (the intention of the
donee to execute the power, however manifested, will make the execution valid
and effective, and unless the contrary is shown by the testator's will a general
residuary clause will operate as an execution of the power); Taylor v. Eatman,
92 N. C. 601 (1885) ("It is not necessary to refer to the power if the act shows
that the donee had in view the subject of the power at the time.") ; see Cone v.
Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 515, 518 (1934) (the Board says the intent to exercise
the power must come from reference to the power, direct reference to the subject
matter, or it may appear from the facts that the instrument would be inoperative
without the exercise of the power).
17 9 T. C. 359 (1947) (the fee given in default was decreased to a remainder
interest by partial appointment to a stranger, and although there was a renuncia-
tion by the appointee, he still took that particular estate under the power).
169 Sup. Ct. 1210 (1949), reversing 168 F. 2d 979 (5th Cir. 1948).
2281 U.S. 111 (1930) (future salary and attorney's fees).
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tained the substance of full enjoyment of all rights and benefits even
though he assigned the already accrued right to receive the income-
Helvering v. Horst.a Blair v. Commissioner, however, drew this dis-
tinction: when there is a recognized valid transfer of income producing
property, the income from that property must per force be taxable to
the transferee. 4 Vigilant to distinguish substance and effect from form
and method, Helvering v. Clifford refused to recognize a transfer for
tax purposes of the beneficial interest where so many strings were
retained by the donor-settlor over the trust property that the actual
dominion and control of the corpus and the ultimate beneficial use of
the income had not shifted.5 Thus Clifford asks: who controls the
production and allocation of the income?
The Earl-Horst, Clifford doctrines and the Blair rule have been
viewed as two sometimes conflicting lines of judicial reasoning. It
therefore becomes important to determine whether capital or services
is the predominant factor in the production of the firm income in order
to appreciate the applicability of these principles and the relative sig-
nificance of the various tests of partnership validity for tax purposes.
The celebrated decisions of Commissioner v. Tower8 and Lusthaus
v. Commissioner7 served to decelerate greatly recognition of family
partnerships by the Tax Court under the Internal Revenue Code.8
In both cases the wife's partnership interest was denied where a prior
gift by the husband was the basis of her capital contribution. The
transactions were viewed as superficial arrangements which did not
result in any actual change in the economic relationships in the business
or in the family. Practically, more important than what Tower and
Lusthaus said was what the Tax Court, in the ensuing months, thought
they said. The tests of original capital contribution, vital services, and,
to a lesser extent, control and management, which had been stated as
factors evincive of a business purpose, were interpreted to be conclusive.
This understandable adherence to stock tests susceptible of some degree
of certainty and objectivity" proved fatal to countless partnerships.9
'311 U.S. 112 (1940) (negotiable coupons for interest detached from bonds);
cf. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940) (insurance renewal commissions).
'300 U.S. 5 (1937) (father's gift to his children of part of his interest in a
trust of which he was beneficiary).
309 U.S. 331 (1940) (short term trust, reversionary rights).
-327 U.S. 280 (1946) (conditional gift of stock in predecessor corporation).
7 327 U.S. 293 (1946) (gift from husband and notes payable out of her share
of profits).
'Applicable provisions are INT. REv. CoDE §§11, 22(a), 181, 182, 3797.
0 Circuit courts have been more generous to the taxpayer than the Tax Court.
This fact is even more important since the rule of Dobson v. Comm'r., 320 U.S.
489 (1943) has been repudiated by amendment to §1141(a) of INT. RFv. COD. De-
cisions of the Tax Court are now reviewable "in the same manner and to the same
extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury." See
Note, 1 STAN. L. REv. 305 (1949).
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In Culbertson, therefore, the Court was confronted with the task of
correcting misdirected emphasis. At the insistence of a partner bowing
out of a cattle firm because of ill health, the four sons of the other
partner, the taxpayer, were given a one-half interest in order to pre-
serve intact the brood herd. The sale of this interest to the sons was
accomplished by a note which was largely paid by (1) a gift from the
taxpayer, and (2) a loan procured by the newly formed Culbertson &
Sons partnership. Since the sons were in the Army and in college
during the tax years, no substantial services were rendered. The Tax
Court taxed the entire income to the father; the Fifth Circuit reversed,
holding it enough that the sons intended to contribute their efforts to
the business in the future. The Supreme Court rejected both inter-
pretations and remanded the cause to the Tax Court. Tax validity was
made to turn on an issue of whether, in consideration of all the facts,
"the parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended
to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise."10  True,
absence of evidence of the old determinative factors has the effect of
placing a heavy burden in proving bona fide intent, but presence or
absence of any or all of these factors is no longer controlling."' This
much is made clear: original capital is not essential; intent may be
predicated upon investment of an intra-family gift. It is uncertain
how far reaching the effects will be. Significant indeed is the recent
statement of a distinguished circuit judge: "The Commissioner asserts
that Culbertson represents an affirmation of the rationale of Tower and
Lusthaus. We doubt the validity of this contention."' 2
What are the basic criteria, considered separately, which go to prove
or tefeat a bona fide intent to form a "business purpose" partnership?
Capital contribution. Origination of the capital with the incoming
family member, while no longer a requirement, is of great evidentiary
value in proving that there is in fact a valid contribution rather than a
sham paper reallocation. Capital from the personal estate of the osten-
sible partner is the most readily acceptable.'8 If the source is a prior
10 Culbertson v. Comm'r., 69 Sup. Ct. 1210, 1216 (1949).
"A reading of a portion of the opinion without reference to the decision in its
entirety may well lead to the conclusion that either contribution of capital or
rendition of services within the tax year is still essential; to wit: "if it is con-
ceded that some of the partners contributed neither capital nor services to the
partnership during the tax years in question. . . it can hardly be contended that
they are in any way responsible for the production of income during those years."
(p. 1213). Clearly, this is dictum which a literal minded Tax Court could seize
upon to justify a continuation of their previous line of reasoning.
" Major, Chief Cir. Judge, in Greenberger v. Comm'r., 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX
REP. §9454 (7th Cir. 1949).
1" Canfield v. Comm'r., 168 F. 2d 907 (6th Cir. 1948) (inheritance) ; Weizer v.
Comm'r., 165 F. 2d 772 (6th Cir. 1948) (insurance policy) ; Florence R. Miller,




gift of money from the taxpayer, recognition seems most often to de-
pend on whether it is anticipatory to the formation of the partnership. 14
It is enough that the contribution to the business was made some years
prior to the tax year.' 5  Contributions in the form of notes payable
out of the profits of the partnership or by a gift from the taxpayer have
not generally been held sufficient.1 6 Nor have contributions of proceeds
from a gift of stock in a predecessor corporation donated in anticipation
of the creation of the partnership satisfied the test in most cases.' 7
Vital services.'8 The following considerations are germane to this
test: (1) relative importance in the scheme of the business ;19 (2) com-
petence of the family member by way of special training and practical
experience ;20 (3) reliance placed on the judgment and position of the
alleged partner;21 (4) status as more than a mere employee who
receives wages periodically.
In a partnership which is chiefly one of personal service it is more
essential that the family member stand in the shoes of any other partner
who holds an interest by his service. At times the Tax Court has been
prone, unrealistically, it is believed, to label services of a family member
as "wifely assistance" or "voluntary"-a mere filial or marital duty.22
Thus, it is incumbent on the taxpayer's attorney to negative this impli-
1 See Greenberger v. Comm'r., 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP,. §9454 (7th Cir.
1949).
Graber v. Comm'r., 171 F. 2d 32 (10th Cir. 1949).18Lusthaus v. Comm'r., 327 U.S. 293 (1946) (profits); Boyd v. Comm'r., 171
F. 2d 546 (6th Cir. 1949) (gift) ; Hougland v. Comm'r., 166 F. 2d 815 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948) (profits). But where basis is a loan secured by
the partnership, Culbertson will direct a different result.
"' Comm'r. v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946) ; Scherf v. Comm'r, 161 F. 2d 495(5th Cir. 1947) ; Maudlin v. Comm'r., 155 F. 2d 666 (4th Cir. 1946). Test satis-
fied where gift of stock was not anticipatory in Lawton v. Commissioner, 164
F. 2d 380 (6th Cir. 1947).
"a Notice use of phrase, "valuable services," Graber v. Comm'r., 171 F. 2d 32(10th Cir. 1949) ; "substantial services," Wilson v. Comm'r., 161 F. 2d 661 (7th
Cir. 1947).!"Not sufficiently important: Edwin F. Sandburg, 8 T. C. 423 (1947) (han-
dling invoices, collecting rents, answering phones) ; Davis v. United States, 5
CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §9349 (6th Cir. 1949) (writing occasional letters, making
bank deposits); Dewey F. Cobb, 5 CCH FED. TAx REP. §7613 (T. C. 1949) (part
time work).
Office work in a supervisory capacity is increasingly being given cognizance.
Ron W. Wood, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §7413 (M) (T. C. 1949) (main-
tenance of business records, custody of funds, hiring of personnel) ; David L.
Jennings, 10 T. C. 505 (1948).
Of vital importance: William Grace, 10 T. C. 1 (1948) (employing and dis-
charging personnel, sales promotion, closing sales contracts).
o Son received college training for the j.ob: Culbertson -V. Comm'r., 69 Sup. Ct.
1210 (1949); Lawton v. Comm'r., 164 F. 2d 380 (6th Cir. 1947). Commerce
school partnership valid where wife better qualified than taxpayer husband because
of training and experience: Allen v. Knott, 166 F. 2d 798 (5th Cir. 1948).
"' Woosley v. Comm'r., 168 F. 2d 330 (6th Cir. 1948); S. B. Forsythe, 10
T. C. 417 (1948) (taxpayer illiterate).
22 E.g., most recently, H. V. Funai, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §7670 (T. C.
1949).
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cation with clarity. It is suggested that an inference of "filial aid" is
less apparent. Services during the tax year are most acceptable; future
services are ineffective, asserts Culbertson-although in view of the
Culbertson standard of bona fide intent this is open to some doubt.
There are indications that services prior to tax years are influential.238
Receipt and use of the profits. A separate bookkeeping entry and
segregation of funds, as by creation of a separate bank account, are
persuasive indicia.2 4 The partner must have unhampered use of his
earnings. Status is doubtful where proceeds though credited to the
family member must remain in the business, or cannot be withdrawn
without the taxpayer's consent,25 or where the use of the income is
controlled by the taxpayer.2 6 Some cases state that'if the family mem-
ber, especially the wife, uses the income to purchase family necessaries,
the income is not truly that of the family member 2 7-a position not
exempt from attack. The rule purported to be followed is that there
must be a substantial change in the economic relationship among the
family members and in the dominion over the business.
Management and control. What voice does the ostensible partner
have in policy formation and the direction of business affairs (as dis-
tinguished from services) ?28 Where there has been an outright gift
of the interest in the firm, the absence of any participation in the man-
agement may serve to 'defeat division of income. 29 The right to repur-
chase the interest either at original value or value at the time of re-
purchase is indicative of lack of control by the alleged partner.80
Form of the agreement. The form of the agreement is not so im-
portant as the fact of the agreement. It cannot be an afterthought.
Oral agreements have been held effective,31 but the existence of a formal
written partnership agreement is of strong evidentiary value to mani-
" E.g., Wenig v. Comm'r., 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §9348 (D. C. Cir. 1949) ;
Singletary v. Comm'r., 155 F. 2d 207 (5th Cir. 1946) (wife did little during tax
year due to birth of child).
' Canfield v. Comm'r., 168 F. 2d 907 (6th Cir. 1948); Appel v. Smith, 161
F. 2d 121 (7th Cir. 1947).
2 Economos v. Comm'r., 167 F. 2d 165 (4th Cir. 1948).28E.g., Jerry Maiatico, 12 T. C 146 (1949).
7Wilson v. Comm'r., 161 F. 2d 661 (7th Cir. 1947) ; Dewey F. Cobb, 5 CCH
1949 FED. TAX R.EP. §7613 (T. C. 1949).28Validity upheld: Emanuel Greenwald, 5 CCH 1948 FED. TAX REP. §7428 (M)
(T. C. 1948) (Even though the agreement provided that the taxpayer should have
exclusive control, in actuality the son did large part of buying and selling.) ; Hewett
Grocery Co., 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REIP. §7264(M) (T. C. 1949). Validity denied:
Delong v. Allen, 5 CCH 1948 FED. TAX REP. §9326 (M. D. Ga. 1948) (taxpayer
controlled personnel, handled purchasing, borrowed money, disposed of assets-
without the consent of the others).2 Fletcher v. Comm'r., 164 F. 2d 182 (2d Cir. 1947).
'0 Davis v. United States, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §9349 (6th Cir. 1949)
(agreement: "absolute, unquestioned right at any time he [taxpayer] may desire,
to purchase the one-tenth interest").21Weizer v. Comm'r., 165 F. 2d 722 (6th Cir. 1948); Walsh v. Shaughnessy,
77 F. Supp. 577 (N. D. N. Y. 1948).
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fest an intent to form a partnership.3 2 The written agreement, however
may be unfortunate if it includes statements which the Tax Court can
seize upon as indicative of a "mere paper reallocation." Also, the court
may conceivably look upon the technical intricacies of the articles of
agreement as form without substance skillfully drawn to give appearance
of reality when the draftsman's purpose is tax avoidance.
Business motive may be further manifested by: (1) proper notifica-
tion of the existence of the partnership to or recognition by parties
doing business with the firm or inclusion of the family member in the
trade name, tested by the query: was it known to the world as a partner-
ship?; (2) improvement of credit standing by inclusion of family mem-
ber's personal liability-absent original contribution of capital;33 (3)
interest in perpetuating the business in the family by training the part-
ner someday to assume full control; (4) interest in securing fuller
cooperation in the present operation of the business by giving family
member responsibility of partnership standing; (5) request by family
member to be made a partner, or demand by other partner or business
associate outside of the family;34 (6) reasonable proportion between
share of earnings and the income producing value of the contribution
made to the firm ;35 and (7) consistency in treatment of all phases of
the purported partnership in regard to the family arrangement.
What is the effect of a tax avoidance motive? The answer is one
of uncertainty since the language used by the courts often seems incon-
sistent with the results reached. Clearly, evidence of a tax avoidance
motive has often been the elusive straw that broke the partnership's
back. This result may be rationalized by saying that it operates in a
negative fashion, militating against bona fide intent to do business in
the partnership form; though it may be that freedom from the tax
avoidance motive should baldly be listed among the requirements of
tax validity. Courts still pay lip service to the principle that the tax-
payer may reduce his tax burden by any legal means,3 6 but the Tax
Court seldom foregoes an opportunity to "pierce the shroud" and lay
" Singletary v. Comm'r., 155 F. 2d 207 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Alexander Jarvis, 5
CCH 1946 FED. TAX REP. §7519 (M) (T. C. 1946).
"Hartz v. Comm'r., 170 F. 2d 313 (8th Cir. 1948).
Culbertson v. Comm'r., 69 Sup. Ct. 1210 (1949).
"A unique development is the reallocation by the Tax Court, in disregard of
the express provisions of the articles of partnership, of the income according to
the relative income producing value of the partner's contribution. Robinson, The
Allocation Theory in Family Partnership Cases, 25 TAXES 963 (1947). But in
view of the rejection of this judicial contract-writing by the circuit courts in
Canfield v. Comm'r., 168 F. 2d 907 (6th Cir. 1948), and Woosley v. Comm'r.,
168 F. 2d 330 (6th Cir. 1948), the process of reallocation may have been abated.
In addition, the court has recognized certain participants in the agreement and
not others, selecting those around whom the halo of bona fide intent glows most
brightly. W. F. Harmon, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §7596 (T. C. 1949); R. C.
Hitchcock, 12 T. C. 22 (1949).
" Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
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bare an attempt to escape the tax burden.' It is submitted that the
distinction should be more clearly delineated between tax avoidance as
a primary or sole aim, which may negate business purpose, and tax
avoidance as a concomitant or secondary result, which is not relevant
to Tax Court findings.3 8
It has often been stated that validity of the partnership under state
law has no bearing on tax recognition. The effect, however, of validity
under commercial rules on tax determination could quite conceivably be
changing. It is arguable that, since under a partnership recognized by
the local law, the separate property of the family member in the event
of insolvency is liable for the satisfaction of partnership debts ;30 and
since the member is entitled to his portion of the assets in event of dis-
solution,40 there are present the necessary elements of reality, business
purpose, and change in domination which are demanded. 41 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Culbertson asserts that Tower "did not purport to an-
nounce a special concept of 'partnership' for tax purposes differing from
the concept that rules in ordinary commercial law cases. ' 4 2
Treatment of the problem by the courts since Culbertson is signifi-
cant. Although many questions are left unanswered, several clear in-
dications are discernible.
1. By and large the courts have accepted the change in emphasis,
required by the Supreme Court, from exclusive determinative tests
to a consideration of all factors revealing intent.43
2. If capital contribution is relied upon, it need not be original with
the family member; effect is given though the source is a prior ir-
revocable gift from the taxpayer.44
3. Although the result does not necessarily follow, in practical ef-
fect a partnership which would have been valid before Culbertson
will likely be valid now.
4. Absent other factors, an outright gift of an interest is still in-
effective. 45
"E.g., Grayson v. Deal, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §9408 (N. D. Ala. 1949).
" It is logically arguable, however, that a real partnership may be intended and
formed though the sole motivation is tax avoidance, since the reality of the product
is more the issue than the mental attitude which originally led the taxpayer to put
the machinery into operation.
" UNIFORM PARTNESHIp Ace, §15 (unless the liability is limited).
40 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr, §38. 4" Note, 46 COL. L. REv. 677 (1946).
" Culbertson v. Comm'r., 69 Sup. Ct. 1210, 1218 (1949).
"But cf. W. S. Barrett, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §7631 (T. C. 1949).
"Edw. A. Theurkauf, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §7626 (T. C. 1949) (prob-
ably the high water mark of Tax Court liberality-gift of stock to wife; within
one month she contributed proceeds to newly formed partnership) ; Greenberger v.
Comm'r., 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §9454 (7th Cir. 1949); Atkins v. United
States, 5 CCH 1949 Fm. TAX REP. §9407 (W. D. La. 1949) ; Joseph Middlebrook,
5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §7597 (T. C. 1949). But cf. Lowry v. Comm'r., 154
F. 2d 448 (6th Cir. 1946) (pre-Cuibertson).
"Rocco J. Cardone, 5 CCH 1949 FFD. TAX REP. §7584(M) (T. C. 1949).
But cf. Ginsburg v. Arnold, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §9396 (5th Cir. 1949).
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5. Evidence of tax avoidance motive may still be fatal 4 6
6. Generally the courts have caught the spirit of Culbertson re-
markably well. Although numerical weight settles nothing, it may
be noted that the majority of decisions since Culbertson have been
favorable to the taxpayer; decidedly the opposite was true pre-
viously.
Two cases which seem to prescribe typically the limits under Cul-
bertson deserve special notice. The court in Morrison v. Cominis-
sioner4T denied validity where, though the formalities of agreement were
indulged in, the taxpayer retained domination over the business, provid-
ing no separation of earnings nor power of ostensible partners to draw
checks on the account. In Ginsberg v. Arnold4" the interest of the son
was a direct gift; the father exercised control over the writing of checks;
the son was in the Army during the tax years. Yet on rehearing the
circuit court found an intent to create a partnership for the benefit of
the business.
In order to encourage this socially desirable method of perpetuating
the family business; in order to reduce the inequality in the effect given
intra-family transfers within corporations and in partnerships;49 in
order to recognize the very real consequences of a genuine commercial
partnership, perhaps parent-child partnership will be viewed more fa-
vorably by the courts under the impetus of the Culbertson case.50
HUBERT B. HuMPHREY, JR.
Torts--Unborn Child-Right of Action
for Prenatal Injury
A search through the North Carolina Digest, Reports, and Anno-
tated General Statutes has disclosed no North Carolina case in which
an action has been brought by or on behalf of a child for prenatal in-
juries. A probable reason for this situation is that, by the decided pre-
ponderance of case authority, no right of action has been recognized for
"Grayson v. Deal, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx RzP. §9408 (N. D. Ala. 1949).
'7 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §9436 (2d Cir. 1949).
AS5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §9396 (5th Cir. 1949), vacating on rehearing 5
CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §9381 (5th Cir.); accord: 0. H. Delchamps, 5 CCH
1949 FED. TAX REP. §7560 (T. C. 1949). But cf. Lusthaus v. Comm'r., 327 U.S.
293 (1946).
' There is evidence, however, of the beginnings of a movement to reduce the
transfer rights within a corporation to the partnership level. See Alexandre, The
Corporate Counterpart of the Family Partnership, 2 TAx L. REv. 493 (1947).
" Congressional action has been suggested to tax the income of parents and
minor children as a unit or to deal with the family partnership problem as a whole.
See Wales, The 1949 Relevance of the Revenue Bill of 1948, 62 HARv. L. REv.
957, 972-74 (1949).
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physical disability' or wrongful death2 of a child for injuries received
before birth. Legal writers, however, who have discussed the problem
have been almost unanimously in favor of recognizing such a right of
action.8 The purpose of this note is to summarize briefly the law on
this subject in the light of recent decisions, and to consider the possible
effect of these decisions on the law of North Carolina.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently held that a viable4 child
which is injured while en ventre sa mere and which survives the injury
has an action for personal disability suffered by reason of the negligence
of another.5 The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in a decision handed
down two days later, held that the personal representative of an unborn
viable child whose death is alleged to have been caused by the wrongful
acts or omissions of the physician in charge of the mother and of the
hospital in which she was confined may maintain an action therefor,
under the wrongful death statute6 of that state, on behalf of the next of
kin of such deceased child.7
Two reasons are usually advanced by those courts which refuse to
allow recovery by the child. First, there is no person in existence at
the time of the injury to whom the defendant owes a duty of care.8
Second, there seems to be a widespread fear of fraudulent suits because
of the difficulty of proof of any causal connection between the tortious
act and the resulting damage.9
1 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 IIl. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900) ; Smith v.
Luckhardt, 299 IIl. App. 100, 19 N. E. 2d 446 (1939); Stemmer v. Kline, 128
N. J. L. 455, 26 A 2d 489 (1942) ; Ryan v. Public Service Coordinated Transport,
18 N. J. Misc. 429, 14 A. 2d 52 (1940) ; Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133
N. E. 567 (1921) ; Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940);
Lewis v. Steve's Sash & Door Co., 177 S. W. 2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944);
Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N. W. 916 (1916).
2Stanford v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926) ; Dietrich
v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. St. Rep. 242 (1884) ; New-
man v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N. W. 710 (1937); Buel v. United Ry., 248
Mo. 126, 154 S. W. 71 (1913); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 49 Atd. 704
(1901); Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S. W. 2d
944 (1935).
'Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 CALIF.
L. REv. 461 (1922); Anderson, Rights of Action of an Unborn Child, 14 TENN.
L. REv. 151 (1936) ; Frey, Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa Mere, 12 ST. Louis
L. RFv. 85 (1927) ; Kerr, Action by Unborn Infant, 61 CENT. L. J. 364 (1905) ;
Morris, Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa Mere, 58 CENT. L. J. 143 (1904);
Straub, Right of Action for Prenatal Injuries, 33 LAw NoTEs 205 (1930) ; Notes,
28 CALIF. L. REV. 107 (1939), 6 CORI. L. Q. 341 (1921), 34 HARV. L. REv. 549
(1921), 36 MICH. L. REv. 512 (1938), 20 MINN. L. Rav. 321 (1936), [1949] U.
OF ILL. LAW FORUm 537, 44 YALE L. 3. 1468 (1935).
' "Capable of living; physically fitted to live; of a fetus, having reached such
a stage of development as to permit continued existence, under normal conditions,
outside of the womb." THE NEW CENTuuRY DICTIONARY, Vol. II, p. 2143 (1938).
r Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E. 2d 334(1949).
'MINN. STAT. §573.02 (1945).
Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N. W. 2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
, Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900).
' "And it is easy to see on what a boundless sea of speculation in evidence this
new idea would launch us." Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 L. R. Ir. 69 (1891).
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An examination of the first reason indicates that it is not well
founded from the standpoint of medical science, especially if a distinc-
tion is made between a nonviable child and a viable child. A viable
child is more than just a "part" of the mother. It has its own bodily
form and members, manifests all the anatomical characteristics of indi-
viduality, possesses its own circulatory, vascular and excretory systems,
and is at the time of the injury capable of being ushered into the visible
world.10 From the legal standpoint, other fields of law have long rec-
ognized the rights of an unborn infant. The criminal law regards it as
a separate entity.11 A posthumous child has been allowed to participate
in the recovery for the wrongful death of its father,i s and in the law
of property it is considered in esse for all purposes beneficial to it.'1
If an unborn child is, in contemplation of law, considered a human being
for these purposes, consistency would seem to require that it be con-
sidered a human being for the more important purpose of redressing
wrongs committed against it.
Turning to the second reason advanced, difficulty of medical proof
in cases of this nature must be recognized. Pathologists readily a'dmit
that it is impossible in many instances for medical science to establish
with any degree of certainty the causal connection between prenatal
injury and subsequent physical disability or death. However, at least in
some cases, this connection can be definitely established.' 4 It is ele-
mentary that if a wrong has been committed, there should be a remedy.
A high standard of medical proof would preclude any justifiable fear
of fraudulent suits, and at the same time permit recovery in those cases
where a causal connection can be shown with reasonable certainty.
It would seem then that the Supreme Courts of Ohio and Minnesota
have adopted the better view. They have definitely followed the modern
trend. 15 The cases in both courts were decided on demurrer and uphold
a right of action in the unborn child for prenatal injuries. The opinions
of both cases indicate that the courts were concerned primarily with the
" Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D. C. 1946).
"1 Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1898) ; State v. Waiters, 199 Wis.
68, 225 N. W. 167 (1929).
" Herndon v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 37 Okla. 256, 128 Pac. 727 (1912).
3 Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N. C. 503, 52 S. E. 201 (1905) ; Biggs v. McCarty,
86 Ind. 352, 44 Am. Rep. 320 (1882). For discussions of the rights of the unborn
child in various fields of law, see Notes, 28 CALIF. L. REv. 107 (1939), E1949]
U. OF ILL. LAW FoRuM 537, 44 YALE L. J. 1468 (1935).
"Rex. v. Senior, 168 Eng. Rep. 1298 (1832) ; GLAISTER, MEDICAL JURISPRU-
DENCE & ToxIcoLOGY 320 (7th ed. 1942) ; MALOY, LEGAL ANAToY & SURGERY 685(1930); Winfield, The Unborn Child, 4 U. OF TORONTO L. J. 278, 293 (1942).
" Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D. C. 1946) ; Montreal Tramways v.
Leveille, 4 D. L. R. 337 (1933) ; See Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359,
368, 56 N. E. 638, 640 (1900) ; Stemmer v. Kline, 19 N. J. Misc. 15, 17 A. 2d 58(1940) (allowing recovery), reversed, 128 N. J. L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (1942)
(9-6 decision).
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legal rights involved and that neither the fear of fraudulent suits nor
the difficulty of medical proof has influenced these decisions.
The Ohio Court found that an unborn infant is a person within the
meaning -of Section 16 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which
requires that "all courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done him in his Jan'd, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of Jaw, and shall have justice administered without denial
or delay." Once this conclusion is reached, there is no need for legis-
lative action to confer on the child a right to sue in tort for prenatal
injuries. The North Carolina Constitution has precisely the same pro-
vision as that relied on by the Supreme Court of Ohio. 16
The M.innesota Court recognizes that an unborn viable child is a
person by allowing the personal representative of such child to sue under
the ,Minnesota wrongful death statute. That statute provides in part:
"When 'death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any person
or corporation, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain
an action therefor if he might have maintained an action, had he lived,
for an injury caused by the same act or omission." The Court expresses
the view that "it seems too plain for argument that where independent
existence is possible and life is destroyed through a wrongful act a cause
of action arises under the statutes cited." The North Carolina wrong-
ful death statute is very similar in its terms to that of Minnesota.1 7
The unborn child is far from a nonentity in North Carolina. The
abortion statute' 8 was designed to .protect the child en ventre sa inere.
In property law it may take by deed'9 or by descent.20 A trustee must
be appointed to protect the interest of the child in esse in the sale of a
remainder.21 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recognized
that an unborn infant may be regarded as having a separate existence.
Mr. Justice Winborne states, "The question then arises as to how far
the pregnancy should be advanced before the child is capable of being
destroyed. The general rule is that the child with which the woman is
pregnant must be so far advanced as to be regarded in law as having a
separate existence-a life capable of being destroyed. ' 22
It is to be noted that the Ohio case decides only that an unborn child
N. C. CowsT. Art. I, §35.
'
7 N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (1943).
'IN. C. GN. STAT. §14-44 (1943); State v. Jordon, 227 N. C. 579, 42 S. E.
2d 674 (1947).
11 N. C. GEa. STAT. §41-5 (1943); Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N. C. 503, 52
S. E. 201 (1905); Heath v. Heath, 114 N. C. 547, 19 S. E. 155 (1894).20 Deal v. Sexton, 144 N. C. 157, 56 S. E. 691 (1907).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-11 (1943); Butler v. Winston, 223 N. C. 421, 27 S. E.
2d 124 (1943) ; McAfee v. Green,.143 N. C. 411, 55 S. E. 828 (1906).2 State v. Forte, 222 N. C. 537, 538, 23 S. E. 2d 842, 843 (1943) quoting with
approval Foster v. State, 182 Wis. 298, 196 N. W. 233 (1923) to the effect that




may recover for injuries to it if it was capable of living at the time of
the injury and has demonstrated its capacity to survive by surviving.
The Minnesota case goes further in allowing an action for the wrongful
death of the child. Talks with pathologists have indicated that proof
that the injury caused the death of the child would be no more difficult
than proof that the injury caused subsequent physical damage. In the
latter case, the additional problem arises of determining whether or not
the child was viable at the time of the injury; that is, was the child
capable of surviving outside the womb so as to bring it within the defi-
nition of a person? That problem is not insurmountable, and consistent
judicial reasoning would seem to require that there be a right of action
for the wrongful death of the child as well as for physical disability.
Medical proof, or the absence of medical proof, must eventually de-
termine whether or not there can be a recovery for physical disability
or wrongful death from prenatal injuries. In spite of the fact that on
many occasions a causal connection undoubtedly will be impossible defi-
nitely to establish, it is submitted that an unborn child which has reached
the viable stage in the pregnancy period is more than just a part of the
mother but has a separate existence, and that it should not be denied
the right to go into the Courts of North Carolina or of any other juris-
diction to claim redress for personal injuries inflicted on it before birth.
W. BRAXTON SCHELL.
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